Surreal decisions

Chen, Eddy Keming; Rubio, Daniel

doi:10.1111/phpr.12510

Cited by 33 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…So I think we need some way of incorporating infinite values into decision theory without leading to paralysis anyway. And I think there is one: it probably involves using surreal numbers (Chen and Rubio 2020).…”

Section: Ways Nas Might Be Truementioning

confidence: 99%

What if We Contain Multiple Morally Relevant Subjects?

Crummett

2022

Utilitas

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First, I introduce the concept of a “non-agential subject,” where a non-agential subject (1) exists within an organism and (2) has phenomenally conscious experiences in a morally significant way, but (3) is not morally responsible for (some or all of) the organism's voluntary actions. Second, I argue that it's a live possibility that typical adult humans contain non-agential subjects. Finally, I argue that, if there are non-agential subjects, this has important and surprising implications for a variety of ethical issues. Accordingly, ethicists should pay more attention to whether there are non-agential subjects and what their implications for ethics would be.

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Section: Ways Nas Might Be Truementioning

confidence: 99%

What if We Contain Multiple Morally Relevant Subjects?

Crummett

2022

Utilitas

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“…More details can be found in Wenmackers (2018). For a treatment with surreal probabilities and utilities, see Chen and Rubio (2018): their approach also allows them to treat the St. Petersburg paradox.…”

Section: Yet Another Point Of Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I, too, believe this can be a fertile approach. A first proposal has been offered by Chen and Rubio (2018), but it is too early to evaluate it here.…”

Section: Other Ways To Introduce Infinitesimal Probabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

Weirich

2021

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Suppose I am deliberating whether I should live on a boat and sail the Caribbean for a year. This is a decision not to be taken lightly. Many factors will matter for my decision. Several of these depend on uncertain states of the world. Will I be able to make a living? Is my boat really seaworthy? Will I miss my friends? How bad will the next winter be in my home town?1 I understand decision-making under 'uncertainty' here to refer to any case where an agent is not certain what the consequences of her actions will be, or what state will come about. A distinction is sometimes made between risk, uncertainty, ignorance and ambiguity, where 'risk' refers to the case where objective probabilities are known, 'uncertainty' refers to the case where an agent can make a subjective judgement about probabilities, an agent is in a state of 'ignorance' if she cannot make such probability assignments, and 'ambiguity' occurs when an agent can make probability assignments for some states, but not others.12 Risk aversion is further discussed in Section 5.3. Also see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), chapter 6 for more detail on expected utility theory's treatment of risk aversion. 13 This is why von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory is sometimes referred to as a theory of decision-making under risk, and Savage's is referred to as a theory of decision-making under uncertainty. In the former, probabilities are already known, in the latter, subjective probabilities can be assigned by the agent. However, note that, as we pointed out above, von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory can also be applied when probabilities are subjective.49 See, for instance, Wakker (1988). 50 See McClennen (1990) for a characterisation of different dynamic choice rules.

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“…This observation is bad news for any future decision theory that extends the standard theory with exotic new utilities (for example, Chen and Rubio 2018). No such theory can represent Lin's preferences.…”

Section: Don’t Cost a Thingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Infinite Prospects*

Russell

Isaacs

2020

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Here's the plan. (Section 1) The St. Petersburg gamble cannot be assigned any fair value. (2) Standard arguments for orthodox expected utility theory, involving money pumps or regret, are also arguments against the rationality of preferences that give rise to the St. Petersburg gamble. (3) These arguments are doing something very different from familiar arguments for bounded utilities. (4) The structural requirement the arguments support is compatible with infinite utilities. (5) We describe a representation theorem, and explain how money pumps and regret are connected to the first point about fair values. (6) Some misgivings are expressed.

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Surreal decisions

Cited by 33 publications

References 26 publications

What if We Contain Multiple Morally Relevant Subjects?

What if We Contain Multiple Morally Relevant Subjects?

Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

Infinite Prospects*

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