Surkovian Narrative on the Future of Russia: Making Russia a World Leader

Russia’s Complex Engagement with European Union Norms: Sovereign Democracy versus Post-Westphalianism?

“…Secondly, the reforms met resistance from those who disagreed with the transition to a full market economy, particularly but not only in the form in which it was being conducted. Many opponents believed that it was an alien imposition of values that were out of line with traditional Russian practices-if not the state-managed communism of the Soviet period, then a longer-standing communal approach (Mäkinen 2011). Here, critics also questioned whether liberal democracy imported from the West suited the more communal and authoritarian Russian historical practices.…”

‘With a Little Help from my Friends’: Russia’s Modernisation and the Visa Regime with the European Union

“…In this vision ideas of modernisation are introduced in a controlled manner in different sectors, especially in the economy and the military. This selective modernisation model reproduced the former Russian and Soviet modernisation discourses that stress Russia's distinctive path to modernisation, including Russia's distinctive path to democracy which is characterised in the concept of 'sovereign democracy' (Mäkinen 2011). Sovereign democracy itself has been understood as an authoritarian and conservative form of modernisation (Hayoz 2012, p. 20).…”

“…Interestingly for him democracy in Russia had instrumental value for cooperation with the West. If Russia was not an open democratic society, then it had no access to the modern technology of the West and in consequence it would not be able to carry out modernisation (Mäkinen 2011).…”

“…During Medvedev's presidency the most noteworthy and visible people in the group whose approach was more comprehensive were President Medvedev, the presidential aide Arkadii Dvorkovich, and the chair of the Institute of Contemporary Development (Institut sovremennogo razvitiya-INSOR), Igor Yurgens. The group advocated comprehensive modernisation including political reforms (Afanas'ev 2009;Mäkinen 2011).…”

“We need more clips about Putin, and lots of them:” Russia's state-commissioned online visual culture

“…6 His works include several of the most viewed examples of the viral video genre. Examining the output of young creatives patronized by the Kremlin can offer a "bottom-up" view to supplement studies of the Russian ideological and media landscape as shaped by "political technologists" such as Vladislav Surkov and Gleb Pavlovskii (Wilson 2005;Okara 2007;Sakwa 2008;Mäkinen 2011;Pomerantsev 2014). Where these ideologues often speak in abstract terms, Degtiarev's output constitutes tangible evidence of how theory translates into practice, in what turns out to be a rather messier and less linear process than the standard model of a top-down "Kremlin propaganda machine" would suggest.…”