Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability.

Tversky, Amos; Koehler, Derek J.

doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.4.547

Cited by 932 publications

(634 citation statements)

References 1,024 publications

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“…In turn, the superiority of RH to RH is due to the higher estimate of Pr (B) when it is decomposed as Pr (A∩B)+Pr (A∩B) (subadditivity). As discussed in the Introduction, such decomposition often (but not invariably) increases estimates of event probability (Tversky and Koehler, 1994;Sloman et al, 2004).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Subadditive judgment was originally documented in Fischhoff et al (1978) and confirmed by Russo and Kolzow (1994), Tversky and Koehler (1994), and others. It is the principal motivation for Support Theory (Tversky and Koehler, 1994;Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997;Brenner and Koehler, 1999), which exhibits the judged probability of an event as a function of the evidential support brought to mind by the event's description.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 84%

“…It is the principal motivation for Support Theory (Tversky and Koehler, 1994;Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997;Brenner and Koehler, 1999), which exhibits the judged probability of an event as a function of the evidential support brought to mind by the event's description. In sum, events that are mentally represented as intersections may recruit ad- ditional support, exaggerating their probability in comparison with events represented more simply.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the provenance of judgments of conditional probability

Zhao¹,

Shah²,

Osherson³

2009

Cognition

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In standard treatments of probability, Pr (A|B) is defined as the ratio of Pr (A∩B) to Pr (B), provided that Pr (B) > 0. This account of conditional probability suggests a psychological question, namely, whether estimates of Pr (A|B) arise in the mind via implicit calculation of Pr (A ∩ B)/Pr (B). We tested this hypothesis (Experiment 1) by presenting brief visual scenes composed of forms, and collecting estimates of relevant probabilities. Direct estimates of conditional probability were not well predicted by Pr (A ∩ B)/Pr (B). Direct estimates were also closer to the objective probabilities defined by the stimuli, compared to estimates computed from the foregoing ratio. The hypothesis that Pr (A|B) arises from the ratio Pr (A ∩ B)/[Pr (A ∩ B) + Pr (A ∩ B)] fared better (Experiment 2). In a third experiment, the same hypotheses were evaluated in the context of subjective estimates of the chance of future events.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 84%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the provenance of judgments of conditional probability

Zhao¹,

Shah²,

Osherson³

2009

Cognition

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“…In all four studies, high expectations of success related positively to the positivity of experienced fantasies. High expectations of success might have facilitated positive fantasies about the future (Klinger, 1977), and positive fantasies (thoughts and images) might have raised respective expectations of success (Anderson & Godfrey, 1987; summary by Tversky & Koehler, 1994). Regardless of how the positive relation between expectations and fantasies emerged, the observed mutual suppressor effects suggest that future research should benefit from measuring both expectations and fantasies, because they will predict behavior most clearly when the other type of thinking about the future is assessed and (in case of a positive correlation) statistically controlled.…”

Section: Implications For Research On Thinking About the Futurementioning

confidence: 99%

The motivating function of thinking about the future: Expectations versus fantasies.

Oettingen¹,

Mayer²

2002

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

389

383

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Two forms of thinking about the future are distinguished: expectations versus fantasies. Positive expectations (judging a desired future as likely) predicted high effort and successful performance, but the reverse was true for positive fantasies (experiencing one's thoughts and mental images about a desired future positively). Participants were graduates looking for a job (Study 1), students with a crush on a peer of the opposite sex (Study 2), undergraduates anticipating an exam (Study 3), and patients undergoing hip-replacement surgery (Study 4). Effort and performance were measured weeks or months (up to 2 years) after expectations and fantasies had been assessed. Implications for the self-regulation of effort and performance are discussed.

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“…In both sections our analysis unfolds in the context of support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994;Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997), a recent descriptive model of likelihood judgment. Support theory reduces subjective probability to evaluations of hypothesis strength, which may be based on assessments of similarity.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Similarity between Hypotheses and Evidence

Rottenstreich

Brenner

Sood

1999

Cognitive Psychology

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We explore two novel consequences of similarity-based likelihood judgment. In Section I, we distinguish between the evidence on which judgments are based and the hypotheses that serve as the objects of judgment. The location of a feature, whether in the evidence or the hypotheses, influences the perceived similarity between evidence and hypotheses and consequently yields judgments that are inconsistent with the requirements of probability theory. In Section II, we examine judgment of disjunctive hypotheses. For certain types of disjunctions, the assessment of similarity produces consistent nonmonotonicities: the support of a disjunction is smaller than that of one of its components. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings in terms of support theory and the principle of context independence. © 1999 Academic PressA great deal of research has uncovered numerous effects that arise when assessments of similarity form the basis for judgment under uncertainty. For example, in a classic demonstration of the conjunction fallacy, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) found that an outspoken, socially conscious, and single woman named Linda was judged more likely to be a feminist bank teller than a bank teller, despite the fact that the former category is included within, This is truly collaborative work, the order of authorship is arbitrary. We thank

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Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability.

Cited by 932 publications

References 1,024 publications

On the provenance of judgments of conditional probability

On the provenance of judgments of conditional probability

The motivating function of thinking about the future: Expectations versus fantasies.

Similarity between Hypotheses and Evidence

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