Supply chain coordination through integration of innovation effort and advertising support

Env Prog and Sustain Energy

Shang

et al. 2018

This study examines manufacturers' carbon emission reduction level and retailers' low‐carbon promotion effort in a low‐carbon closed‐loop supply chain (CLSC), in which a manufacturer directly collects the used‐products from consumers. Considering both the carbon emission reduction level and low‐carbon promotion effort depending on the market demands, this study investigates the optimal decisions and performances of CLSC under four different game structures, that is, one non‐cooperative structure and three cooperative structures. In the non‐cooperative structure, the manufacturer controls the carbon emission level, the collection level as well as the wholesale price, while the retailer controls the low‐carbon promotion effort and retail price. The cooperative structures consist of one‐way and two‐way cooperation. In one‐way cooperative structure, the manufacturer shares only a part of retailer's low‐carbon promotion cost. In two‐way cooperative structure, the retailer shares partial manufacturer's carbon emission reduction cost or collection cost based on the one‐way cooperative structure. It shows that the two‐way cooperative structure of the co‐op promotion and carbon emission reduction is the optimal in pricing decisions and carbon emission reduction level, as well as two‐way cooperative structure of the co‐op promotion and collection is the optimal in the collection effort. Under lower the consumer's low‐carbon preferences, the retailer agrees to share the manufacturer's collection cost. When the consumer's low‐carbon preferences are higher, the retailer agrees to share the manufacturer's carbon emission reduction cost. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Environ Prog, 38: 143–153, 2019

“…Song et al . studied firms' innovation and advertising decisions in a two‐echelon supply chain . Ji et al .…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is assumed that the manufacturer will induce a total cost during reducing carbon emission, which is an increasing and convex function of carbon emission reduction level and defined as

C ((), e) = \frac{1}{2} U e^{2}

C ((), υ) = \frac{1}{2} K υ^{2}

, s.t.…”

Section: Notations and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative decision in a closed‐loop supply chain considering carbon emission reduction and low‐carbon promotion

Env Prog and Sustain Energy

Shang

et al. 2018

“…Advertising strategy appears in other studies too. Song et al [21] studied integrated firms’ innovation and advertising decisions in a two-echelon supply chain. Martín-Herrán and Sigué [22] in a bilateral monopoly, investigated the optimal scheduling of retailer and manufacturer advertising in a three-period planning horizon.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…

a > 0

p_{x} > 0

. Greater

θ

indicates that retailer

x

and retailer

y

is more competitive, and we derive

0 < θ < 1

(e.g., Song et al [21]; Liu et al [27]; Zhu and He [26]; Wu [30]). …”

Section: Notations and Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Pricing, Carbon Emission Reduction, Low-Carbon Promotion and Returning Decision in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Vertical and Horizontal Cooperation

Shang

et al. 2017

IJERPH

In this paper, we examine the influences of vertical and horizontal cooperation models on the optimal decisions and performance of a low-carbon closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a manufacturer and two retailers, and study optimal operation in the competitive pricing, competitive the low-carbon promotion, the carbon emission reduction, the used-products collection and the profits. We consider the completely decentralized model, M-R vertical cooperation model, R-R horizontal cooperation model, M-R-R vertical and horizontal cooperation model and completely centralized model, and also identify the optimal decision results and profits. It can be observed from a systematic comparison and numerical analysis that the completely centralized model is best in all optimal decision results among all models. In semi-cooperation, the M-R vertical cooperation model is positive, the R-R horizontal cooperation model is passive, and the positivity of the M-R-R vertical and horizontal cooperation model decreases with competitive intensity increasing in the used-products returning, carbon emissions reduction level, low-carbon promotion effort and the profits of the manufacturer and the entire supply chain.

The implications of the carbon tax on the vehicle remanufacturing industry in the complex competitive environment

Guo

et al. 2023

Manage Decis Econ

Under the carbon tax policy, the vehicle remanufacturing has become popular, which threatens the new vehicle market. Facing the complicated competitive environment, the automobile manufacturer always adjusts product modular design to deal with the challenges from the internal and external remanufacturing. Currently, considering the impacts of the complicated market competitions and product modular design on the enterprise's operation management, how the carbon tax policy affects the vehicle remanufacturing is still uncertain. Thus, we construct a duopoly remanufacturing competition model consisting of an automobile manufacturer and remanufacturer with the aim of maximizing profit and determine the optimal product modular design, production, and remanufacturing decisions as well as profits. Then, we explore the impacts of the carbon tax on the vehicle remanufacturing supply chain from the perspectives of the economic, environment, and consumer surplus. The results show that the carbon tax is always disadvantageous to automobile manufacturer's profit but may benefit the automobile remanufacturer's profit. Contrary to the intuition, improving the carbon tax is not always conducive to the environment and harmful to the consumer.