Supermajority Rule in the U.S. Senate

Mayhew, David R.

doi:10.1017/s1049096503001653

Cited by 18 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…This is consistent with evidence offered byMayhew (2003) that indicates relatively narrow majorities were sufficient to legislate in the decades immediately following the 1917 reform (see alsoOppenheimer 1985).15 Our consideration of how costs and end-of-session time constraints affect the pivot theory's predictions is consistent with Krehbiel's strict conception of a pivot, since we conceive of costs primarily in institutional terms, focusing on the rules institutionalizing the costs of obstruction and on the (relatively) exogenous…”

supporting

confidence: 82%

“…758-774 C 2004 by the Midwest Political Science Association ISSN 0092-5853 single senator could threaten to obstruct and kill legislation (Burdette 1940;Heitshusen and Young 2001;Von Holst 1893). On the other hand, some claim that even without a cloture rule, filibusters were rarely successful in blocking legislation, and therefore the Senate was essentially a majoritarian body (Oppenheimer 1985; see also Binder and Smith 1997;Koger 2002;Mayhew 2003). A key contribution of our article is to provide a test of these two competing conventional wisdoms and provide a better historical understanding of one of the most important features of the U.S. Congress.…”

mentioning

confidence: 88%

“…This is consistent with an alternative conventional wisdom about the Senate. For example, Binder and Smith (1997) claim that, at least until the end of the nineteenth century, minorities did not take full advantage of opportunities to obstruct, implying that the median member of the Senate would typically be decisive when it came to passing laws (see also Koger (2002), Mayhew (2003), andOppenheimer (1985)).…”

Section: Competing Theories About Coalition Sizesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Where's the Pivot? Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-Cloture Senate

Wawro¹,

Schickler²

2004

American Journal of Political Science

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This article employs a three-pronged approach to test competing theories regarding the size of coalitions required for passing legislation prior to the adoption of cloture in the Senate. We compare predictions generated by a model derived from the theory of pivotal politics with those generated by the theory of universalism. To test these predictions, we first examine coalition sizes on the passage of significant legislation. Second, we analyze the size of coalitions on dilatory motions as a predictor of success in defeating legislation. Finally, we examine coalition sizes on tariff legislation to assess the degree to which politics in this policy area were majoritarian. We find that a pivotal politics-based model incorporating the median voter and veto pivot generally outperforms universalism in explaining lawmaking patterns in the pre-cloture Senate. Narrow majorities were quite successful at legislating, although minority obstruction fostered uncertainty about the threshold required to force a final vote when adjournment loomed.

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supporting

confidence: 82%

mentioning

confidence: 88%

Section: Competing Theories About Coalition Sizesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Where's the Pivot? Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-Cloture Senate

Wawro¹,

Schickler²

2004

American Journal of Political Science

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“…Moreover, proponents' efforts (the binding vote in the Democratic caucus, efforts to bring traveling Senators back to Washington) were clearly aimed at building majority support. As Mayhew (2003) argued about the 1937 courtpacking bill, this was a struggle for the median voter rather than an effort to build a supermajority. Delay tactics were used by both sides to influence the timing of the final decision, as both sides struggled to convert votes and manipulate attendance to ensure a majority.…”

Section: Bawn and Koger: Effort Intensity And Position Taking 83mentioning

confidence: 99%

Effort, Intensity and Position Taking

Bawn¹,

Koger

2008

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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Effort is a crucial element of the legislative process -writing bills, forming coalitions, crafting strategies, and debating. We develop a model in which legislative decisions are the product of competitive effort by two teams, one trying to pass new legislation, and the other to block it. Teams choose effort levels based on preferences over the policy outcome, political rewards for effort, and opportunity costs, and the team that produces more effort wins. We apply this model to four cases of major legislation from the pre-cloture Senate: passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, the Ship Purchase Act of 1915, the Ship Arming bill of 1917, and the adoption of the Senate cloture rule in 1917. These cases demonstrate the value of looking beyond legislative voting and the rules that structure it, and of including effort as a key element of the legislative game.

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“…Although our principal concern involves understanding the role of preferences and parties for legislative productivity, given its centrality for determining the EGIs, the pre-1917 filibuster requires some commentary (on Rule 22, see Bawn & Koger, 2003;Binder & Smith, 1997;Koger, 2002;Mayhew, 2003;. Although there was a formal rule pre-Rule 22-each member having the right to filibuster and unanimity required for proceeding-assuming unanimity has little plausibility and would not produce a model with meaningful predictive capacity.…”

Section: Thinking About the Pre-1917 Filibuster Rulementioning

confidence: 99%

Preferences, Parties, and Legislative Productivity

Chiou

Rothenberg

2006

American Politics Research

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Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) utilized models of legislative productivity, synthesizing parties and preferences by deriving and measuring different equilibrium gridlock intervals, finding that such models outperformed alternatives depending on preferences alone. However, their temporal scope is limited to post-World War II. Generalizing theoretical models-notably recognizing the 1917 enactment of Rule 22 creating the Senate filibuster ruleand expanding historical scope empirically will produce results, inspiring greater confidence and better ability to distinguish whether partisan features matter. Hence, the authors generalize and test models using data extending to the late 19th century. Results indicate that a model combining preferences with party unity better explains outcomes than does a preference-based model, a model where parties control the agenda but cannot discipline members, or a model where the president rules his legislative party. In addition, findings are consistent with the inference that Rule 22 did not change the filibuster rule guiding the Senate substantially.

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Supermajority Rule in the U.S. Senate

Cited by 18 publications

References 4 publications

Where's the Pivot? Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-Cloture Senate

Where's the Pivot? Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-Cloture Senate

Effort, Intensity and Position Taking

Preferences, Parties, and Legislative Productivity

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