Superior bias in trust-related decisions

Abstract

Trust is conditional. Many studies have revealed its relative conditions in different situations, but when social status is characteristic of the person who receives trust (the “trustee”), our knowledge of how social status affects trust still remains limited. In this study, we used the trust game in order to: (1) characterize the effect of trustees’ social hierarchy on trust-related decisions in different trustworthiness situations and (2) explore the underlying computational process regarding the impact that social status has on trust-related decisions by using the computational modeling approach to integrate social status into trust-related situations. In Experiment 1, using a one-shot trust game with no feedback of information about reciprocity, we found that compared with inferiors, superiors gained more trust-related behaviors (investments) in spite of the fact that they were not rated as having higher trustworthiness. Then, in Experiment 2, when we controlled the trustworthiness of different social status partners by providing the same neutral reciprocity rate (50%) in a repeated trust game, the high-status partner gained more trust than the low-status partner. This superior bias extended to Experiment 3a and 3b, in which we set different levels of trustworthiness to match the different social statuses of partners. With respect to modeling results, we found that higher status holds an additional social value independent of trust profit, resulting in superior bias. Ultimately, this study has shed light on the superior bias that commonly leads people to grant high-status individuals goodwill in social interactions.