Superior Bargaining Power and the Global Food Value Chain: The Wuthering Heights of Holistic Competition Law?

Lianos, Ioannis; Lombardi, Claudio

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2773455

Cited by 10 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Bonnet and Zohra (2015), using a model of Draganska et al (2010), observe that value added created by organic label in the French fluid milk market helped to balance bargaining power along the supply chain. Lianos and Lombardi (2016) use a holistic approach in the Global Value Chain framework. They examine market power and concentration through the vertical links between in the chain to understand if and how lead actors can capture value.…”

Section: Imperfect Price Transmission Along the Food Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the contrary, cooperatives with high market share may discriminate between buyers. In their recent paper, Lianos and Lombardi (2016) acknowledge the different anti-trust policies of the USA and the EU: while cooperatives benefit from anti-trust immunity in the USA, the policy setting in Europe is much more complex and difficult to interpret.…”

Section: Policy Instruments and Market Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

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About farmers’ bargaining power within the new CAP

Velazquez

Buffaria

2017

Agric Econ

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This paper examines the current setting of instruments aimed at rebalancing unequal market power in the food chain. Particular attention is given to horizontal integration possibilities for farmers, and organisations of farmers, as derogations to competition policies contained in the Common Market Organisation Regulation (EU) 1308/2013 (CMO Regulation). Firstly, we propose a review of the literature that looks at the imperfect price transmission along the food chain. Secondly, we examine how CAP of instruments aimed at counterbalancing market inequalities along the chain have been functioning over time, notably if they contributed to improving efficiency, farmers' income and consumers' welfare. Thirdly, we assess the current setting of the CMO Regulation, in particular, the way derogations to the competition policy are defined (exclusions, e.g. producer's organisations). The main research question here is if the current setting does, or does not, allow attaining the objective of strengthening the bargaining power of producers, while at the same time avoiding the creation of monopoly power. Our research highlights that divergent results emerged from studies on the relation between size and profitability or efficiency, with evidence of significant economies of scale. Larger PO not only would be more profitable, but they also may offer more services to their members, especially when these services are associated with significant investment costs. In relation to policy measures aimed at improving the functioning of the food supply chain, the CMO Regulation relies on producer's organisations as the main vehicle for producer cooperation. But the new legislative setting could lead to the paradoxical consequence of impeding the functioning by challenging the existence and/or creation of POs.

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Section: Imperfect Price Transmission Along the Food Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Policy Instruments and Market Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

About farmers’ bargaining power within the new CAP

Velazquez

Buffaria

2017

Agric Econ

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“…Gorton et al (2015) also employed a quantitative analysis to study UTPs in food supply chains in the USA and confirmed that trustworthiness was positively related to fair practices. Using a Global Value Chain framework, Lianos and Lombardi (2016) provided a theoretical framework to examine food value chains in contrast to competition law. Sexton (2017) identified three main approaches and four types of methodologies for empirical investigations of trading practices (interpretive methodologies based on interviews; surveys, either online, by phone, or face to face; case studies; modelling).…”

Section: Methodological Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving market outcomes: A qualitative assessment of the Greek dairy supply chain

Koutouzidou

Ragkos²,

Koutsou

et al. 2020

J Hellenic Vet Med Soc

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This study provides a qualitatative assessment of the overall outcomes of the dairy supply chain in Greece. Based on the framework of the Taskforce for Agricultural Markets, a questionnaire survey with in-depth interviews was conducted to farmers, industries and supermarkets in Greece in order to gain knowledge about trading practices, market transparency, risk management, contracts, access to finance and the role of Producer Organizations. The analysis did not reveal significant unfair trading practices and showed positive prospects for the overall supply chain.

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“…In that respect, differences between monopoly power and bargaining power, the subject of an increasingly active discussion amongst economists and lawyers specializing in antitrust policies (Shastitko and Pavlova, 2017a;Lianos and Lombardi, 2016) provides elements to discuss alternative governance mechanisms as well as regulatory involvement of antitrust authorities in organizing transactions between two interdependent entities.…”

Section: A Different Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

The curse of antitrust facing bilateral monopoly: Is regulation hopeless?

Shastitko¹,

Ménard²,

Pavlova³

2018

RUJEC

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This paper is about the challenges that antitrust authorities face when dealing with bilateral monopolies. The curse of antitrust refers to traps threatening the efficient applicability of antitrust policies in these situations. Standard theories diverge about the attainability of equilibrium under bilateral monopolies but share skepticism about its efficiency if it ever exists. We suggest a different approach, based on transaction cost theory. First, since bilateral monopolies often develop in the upper segment of value chains, misalignment between parties may generate negative externalities. Second, if parties reach an agreement, the impact of the governance mechanism implemented must be assessed beyond the usual parameters of prices and quantities. Indeed, the risk of negative externalities in the absence of appropriate governance increases dramatically when "critical transactions" are at stake. With vertical integration prohibited, second-best alternatives in which antitrust authorities leave room for innovative hybrid governance may allow internalizing externalities while avoiding high switching costs.

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Superior Bargaining Power and the Global Food Value Chain: The Wuthering Heights of Holistic Competition Law?

Cited by 10 publications

References 6 publications

About farmers’ bargaining power within the new CAP

About farmers’ bargaining power within the new CAP

Improving market outcomes: A qualitative assessment of the Greek dairy supply chain

The curse of antitrust facing bilateral monopoly: Is regulation hopeless?

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