Sunni–Shi’a Relations

Abstract

This chapter examines the overlooked role of demographics in sectarian identity formation and sectarian relations in the modern Arab world up to 2003. It will be argued that the demographic imbalance has created minoritarian and majoritarian outlooks. These can sometimes operate in contradictory ways between the various dimensions of sectarian identity – a national minority that is nevertheless part of a transnational majority for example. Demographics have helped shape power relations between sect-centric actors particularly at the transnational and doctrinal dimensions where mainstream conceptions of global Islam tend to be Sunni-inflected. The chapter will demonstrate the profound implications this has had for how sectarian identities are imagined and instrumentalized. In doing so, this chapter will concentrate on the extremes of sectarian polemics and sectarian ecumenism (as opposed to the more common norm of mundane coexistence and sectarian irrelevance). Finally, the role of demographics in state–sect relations and the role that the nation-state has played in minoritization, majoritization and securitization of sectarian identities will be examined. Specifically, it will look at the normativity of Sunni Islam; the often-counterproductive side-effects of state-sanctioned sect-blindness; the securitization of sectarian plurality and of sectarian outgroups; and the intersection of Arab-Iranian rivalry with state-sect relations.

Syria’s Sect-coded Conflict: From Hezbollah’s Top-down Instrumentalization of Sectarian Identity to Its Candid Geopolitical Confrontation

“…7–9). Haddad (2020) emphasized that the overlap of sect and lower-class status amongst the Shia became “a driver for political mobilization” (p. 110).…”

“…Haddad (2020) suggests using “sect-centric party” to refer to a political group representing a sect-specific constituency rather than “sectarian party” because the latter could mean “anything from a party marked by sect-specificity to one that promotes hatred of others” (p. 19). Haddad (2020) explains that the term sectarian “can also mean little more than sect-centricity: a kind of narcissistic attachment to one’s own sectarian identity that may or may not be accompanied by belligerence toward the sectarian other” (p. 45). Although such terms can certainly raise blurry explanations, this article labels Hezbollah as a sectarian party marked by sect-specificity and sectarian identity rather than a party that promotes any kind of hatred or bellicosity against the sectarian other.…”

“…In some cases, Haddad argues, the concept of sectarian identity was mistreated by observers. For instance, while the Baʿath regimes of Syria and Iraq were labeled as “Alawi regime” and “Sunni regime,” respectively, and accused of deploying sectarian identity, they have not deployed “religious heritage as a marker of political identity” but only implemented sect-centricity to favor one sectarian group (Haddad, 2020, p. 26). While this clarification is fully plausible, Hezbollah has deployed sectarian identity to indicate its political identity making it a sectarian party.…”

“…Moreover, Hezbollah deploys sect-specificity on multiple levels. Haddad (2020) narrated how Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s Prime Minister, launched an operation against ISIS in al-Anbar province naming it Labbayk ya Hussain (meaning We are here for you, Oh Hussain ), and was later pressed to change the name to Labbayk ya Iraq (p. 72). Such sect-specific mottos of Shia symbols, such as Labbaiki ya Zeinab (We are here for you, Oh Zeinab) and Labbaika ya Hussain , had been used by Hezbollah fighters when launching operations against Syria’s rebels who happened to be Sunnis.…”

“…Foreign agendas play key roles in deepening sectarian rifts by fueling sectarian identities with political significance. On this matter, Haddad (2020) compares the impact of Ottoman–Persian rivalry to the Western politicization of sectarian identity in the nineteenth century and post-Saddam Middle East (p. 74).…”