2019
DOI: 10.1080/0098261x.2019.1654948
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Succession, Opportunism, and Rebellion on State Supreme Courts: Decisions to Run for Chief Justice

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Cited by 4 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…As an initial matter, a comprehensive comparative analysis of institutional performance with respect to chief judge selection requires more information about how various mechanisms function. Vining, Wilhelm, and Wanless's (2019) study of when associate justices run for chief in election states is exemplary in this regard. Additionally, we need more information about the extent to which chief justice selection institutions impact case outcomes (M. E. K. Hall and Windett 2016;Langer and Wilhelm 2005;Leonard and Ross 2014).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…As an initial matter, a comprehensive comparative analysis of institutional performance with respect to chief judge selection requires more information about how various mechanisms function. Vining, Wilhelm, and Wanless's (2019) study of when associate justices run for chief in election states is exemplary in this regard. Additionally, we need more information about the extent to which chief justice selection institutions impact case outcomes (M. E. K. Hall and Windett 2016;Langer and Wilhelm 2005;Leonard and Ross 2014).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Notwithstanding the centrality of chief justices in the study of judicial and state politics, little is known about what determines their selection. Vining, Wilhelm, and Wanless (2019) examine the conditions under which associate justices run for election to be chief. While electing chief justices is procedurally transparent, peer-vote selections are opaque (but see Langer et al 2003;Norris and Tankersley 2018).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some research also examines the dynamics of popular elections for chief justices. Vining, Wilhelm, and Wanless (2019) found that associate justices who challenge chief justices in popular elections tend to be ideologically distant from the chief. 6 These individuals, they argue, become candidates because they want to flip control of the court's leadership from one political party to another.…”
Section: Prior Research On Chief Justice Selection Rulesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Where citizens choose a chief justice at the ballot box, which occurs in seven states, their success in electing an ideological ally is dependent on information dissemination and the set of choices (candidates). Although only a small proportion of citizens are likely to be trained in law or familiar with the professional acumen of potential chief justices, chief justice elections in most of these states feature either partisan labels (Alabama, North Carolina pre-2002 and post-2017, Texas) or frequent competitive nonpartisan races with right-leaning or leftleaning alternatives (Arkansas, Montana, North Carolina 2002 to 2017, Ohio) that generate data points for voters (Vining, Wilhelm, and Wanless 2019). These ideological cues assist voters to select the jurist-candidate most compatible with their own views (Bonneau and Cann 2015).…”
Section: Prior Research On Chief Justice Selection Rulesmentioning
confidence: 99%