Substance and subsidiarity: the economic dimension of conflict in the early warning system

Huysmans, Martijn; Gruisen, Philippe van

doi:10.1080/07036337.2020.1869956

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…For the EWS, the 2010-2018 data were sourced from Huysmans and van Gruisen (2022), supplemented with data from the InterParliamentary EU information eXchange (IPEX) for the missing years 2019-2020. We define an EWS objection as at least one chamber of parliament having filed a Reasoned Opinion (RO) on a proposal.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, the EWS, at least in theory, is only about subsidiarity – although in practice, parliaments often bring in considerations of proportionality, legal basis or substance as well (Fasone, 2013; Huysmans and van Gruisen, 2022; Jančić, 2015; Jaroszynski, 2020; Tacea, 2021; van den Brink, 2012). Whilst non‐subsidiarity arguments are often brought in, the Commission reserves the right to ignore those in the context of the EWS, as became clear in its response to parliamentary objections to the EPPO (Wieczorek, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Subsidiarity Ex Ante and Ex Post: From the Early Warning System to the Court of Justice of the European Union

Huysmans,

van den Brink,

van Gruisen

2023

J of Common Market Studies

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The subsidiarity principle divides competences between the European Union and its Member States. The Lisbon Treaty suggests a connection between ex ante and ex post subsidiarity review. Ex ante, national parliaments were given a role via the early warning system (EWS). Ex post, legislation is subject to review by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). More than 10 years after Lisbon, this article is the first to theorize and evaluate whether there is indeed a connection. Our theory predicts a conditional connection. Quantitatively, we provide a two‐way classification of Member States based on their use of the EWS and CJEU subsidiarity cases. Qualitatively, we look back from court cases to the Council stage and analyse the Advocate General's opinions in subsidiarity cases. We find a weak conditional connection. A key explanation appears to be the Court's limited willingness to enforce subsidiarity and hence the limited incentives to go to court.

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Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%