Subperfect Game: Profitable Biases of NBA Referees

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates three hypotheses regarding biases of National Basketball Association referees. Identification of basketball referee bias is typically difficult as changes in observed statistics may be caused by either changes in referee bias or player behavior. We identify bias by exploiting the fact that referees have varying degrees of discretion over different types of a particular statistic-turnovers. This allows us to conduct a treatment and control-style analysis, using the less discretionary turnovers as the player behavior control. The results provide evidence that referees favor home teams, teams losing during games, and teams losing in playoff series. All three biases are likely to increase consumer demand.

Television Coverage and Outcome Uncertainty in Sports: Empirical Evidence from the NBA and WNBA. [Cobertura televisiva e incertidumbre en los resultados deportivos: Evidencia empírica en la NBA y la WNBA].

“…Similarly, WNBA games that are broadcast on both national and local television networks generate greater outcome uncertainty, as the coefficient of about −1.7 from Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 indicate. These results for National2 and National23 support and augment the referee bias hypothesis described here and in Groot (2009), Price et al (2012 and Evans et al (2013).…”

“…Maintenance of product quality, or outcome uncertainty, is a function of relative team skills and referee bias, which is an important facet of this study. Given recent research by Groot (2009), Price, Remer, &Stone (2012) and Evans, Yewell, Caudill, &Mixon (2013) indicating how referee bias is useful to various sports leagues in creating greater outcome uncertainty, tests conducted in this study extend the work of these authors by providing links between referee bias, television coverage and outcome uncertainty in professional basketball leagues in the United States.…”

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In an important paper, Price, Remer, & Stone (2012) introduce one manifestation of referee bias called "close" bias -the idea being that because close games are more valuable, referees might officiate to keep games close. Using 990 observations from the 2011-12 National Basketball Association (NBA) season and 442 observations from the 2010 and 2011 Women's National Basketball Association (WNBA) seasons, we test conceptual models of the impact of television coverage on close bias.

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Incentives to lose revisited: The NHL and its tournament incentives

“…Sabotage on the part of athletes was for example reported by 3 Duggan and Levitt (2002), Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2005), Dietl et al (2010), and Balafoutas et al (2012) among others. Unethical behavior was also found on the part of sports officials for example by Kocher (2004), Zitzewitz (2006), Parsons et al (2007), and Price et al (2007Price et al ( , 2009. Dietl et al (2009) showed that making officials aware of present unethical behavior helped to reduce the opportunities for unethical behavior.…”

Referee Bias and Stoppage Time in Major League Soccer: A Partially Adaptive Approach

“…For example, in an important paper on referee bias, Price, Remers, and Stone [11] examine profit-maximizing biases of referees in the National Basketball Association (NBA). They find that referees are likely to favor home teams, teams losing during games, and teams losing in playoff series.…”