Subnational Adaptation Finance Allocation: Comparing Decentralized and Devolved Political Institutions in Kenya

Abstract

Adaptation finance is designed to help vulnerable populations withstand effects of climate variability and change. However, levels of vulnerability seldom determine finance distribution. Political and economic preferences of national and local government decision-makers tend to direct funding streams. This article takes an institutional approach to adaptation finance allocation by comparing decentralized and devolved local governance structures managing adaptation finance in Kenya before and after the Constitution of 2010. Prior to reforms, funding was directed through decentralized mechanisms operating within district councils and local authorities; recently, devolution of political, administrative, and fiscal decision-making to county governments coincided with piloting of new local adaptation funds. Theory suggests that devolution institutionalizes more participative decision-making and fairer allocations. Evidence suggests vulnerable communities are indeed more likely to access, design, and receive allocations of finance in devolved political systems.

Using climate finance to advance climate justice: the politics and practice of channelling resources to the local level

“…Moreover, the emphasis on strong financial management favours vertical authority and centralised decision-making, overlooking consequences for organizations that prioritise horizontal accountabilities. There is evidence, for example, that the allocation of adaptation finance has sometimes been determined by the political and economic preferences of government more than by the nature and level of vulnerability (Barrett, 2015). Formalisation also favours the participation of those who are literate and formally educated, and many community networks seek to ensure the equal participation of those whose homes and livelihoods are embedded in the informal sector.…”

Access and allocation in climate change adaptation

“…It may thus come as no surprise that empirical analyses of adaptation finance distribution find only limited evidence that donors allocate adaptation finance to vulnerable countries or communities (Remling and Persson 2015;Robertsen et al 2015;Betzold and Weiler 2016;Robinson and Dornan 2017;Weiler et al 2018). For the subnational allocation of adaptation finance in Malawi, Barrett (2014: 131) even concludes that "[t]he poorest, most marginalized, and climate vulnerable districts receive the least adaptation finance" (see also Barrett 2015).…”

“…Adaptation itself produces winners and losers (Eriksen et al 2015;Nightingale 2017: 12;Winges and Grecksch 2017;Mikulewicz 2018;Siebenhüner 2018), yet these distributional effects of adaptation measures have been rarely studied (Gibbs 2016). Adaptation may reproduce and even deepen underlying inequalities and social vulnerability, by favouring the wealthier and more powerful, for example in Nepal (Nightingale 2017), Kenya and Malawi (Barrett 2014(Barrett , 2015, and beyond (Thomas and Warner 2019). Research has slowly started to include power politics into adaptation analysis and suggests that the choice of adaptation options depends on access to decision-making (see Sect.…”

Transnational Support for Urban Climate Adaptation: Emerging Forms of Agency and Dependency

“…For example, programs such as the Rockefeller Foundation's Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN) and 100 Resilient Cities program seek to integrate climate priorities into existing urban development. The emergence of global climate finance is providing further incentives for these approaches (Pickering et al 2015;Barrett 2015). To increase the local uptake of these external resources, many cities have combined them with existing intergovernmental grants, local tax sources, and private investments to help fund larger-scale adaptation interventions (Cook and Chu 2018).…”