Subjective Political Economy

Allen, Darcy W E; Berg, Chris

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2799032

Cited by 8 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 93 publications

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“…There must exist a viable alternative to the status quo. That alternative may only become viable as a result of the disruption -increased perceived dictatorship and disorder costs can be a spur to institutional innovation (Allen and Berg 2016). We suggest that such a position does exist in the instance of the Bolt case -to remove the words 'offend' and 'insult' from s. 18C.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…As a framework to describe different institutional choices, the Institutional Possibilities Frontier has been criticised for being excessively vague, and for being unable to distinguish between different political systems (Rosser Jr and Rosser 2008). Allen and Berg (2016) build a framework of subjective political economy by modifying the Djankov et al (2003) approach. First, they observe that while Djankov et al assume that society has chosen the cost-minimising institution, dictatorship and disorder costs are subjective, rather than objective.…”

Section: The Subjective Political Economy Approach and Freedom Of Speechmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, Allen and Berg (2016) disaggregate the Institutional Possibilities Frontier from a society-wide function to individual functions, observing that the institution that society chooses is the result of political bargaining between individuals and groups with subjective Institutional Possibilities Frontiers of different shapes. In this perspective, the 'current institutional order' as depicted in Figure 1 can also be described as the 'status quo'.…”

Section: The Subjective Political Economy Approach and Freedom Of Speechmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Labor's former Finance Minister, Lindsay Tanner, had written a book about the media and politics (Tanner 2011), and Labor supporters had been particularly frustrated with News Limited's perceived antipathy towards the Gillard Government (Cooney 2015). Allen and Berg (2016) argue that self-interest should also be seen through the prism of subjective costs. To the extent that individual political actors were engaged in the debate in pursuit of their material self-interests, those motives are empirically indistinguishable from 'public interest' motives.…”

Section: Ethics and Accountability: The Media Regulation Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

“…We employ a 'subjective political economy framework' (see Allen and Berg 2016) to examine these issues. Building on the insights of Djankov et al (2003), in this framework institutional (or political) change is driven by shifts in the perceived trade-off between disorder costs and dictatorship costs of social control.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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2016

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The paper examines two Australian freedom-of-speech controversies between 2011 and 2013-the debate over section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act, and the debate over the Gillard Government's print media laws. These controversies featured rhetorical and ideological debate about the limits of free speech and the nature of human rights. The paper applies a 'subjective political economy' framework to these debates in order to trace the effect of increased perceived 'disorder costs' and 'dictatorship costs' of freedomof-speech restrictions. The paper concludes that policy change is driven by exogenous changes in perceived institutional costs. In the case of the Gillard Government's media laws, those costs were borne by the Gillard Government, and one would not expect print media laws to be a major political issue in the absence of a further exogenous shock. In the case of section 18C the revealed dictatorship costs of legislation, which includes the words 'offend' and 'insult', suggest the section 18C controversy will endure.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 85%

Section: The Subjective Political Economy Approach and Freedom Of Speechmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Subjective Political Economy Approach and Freedom Of Speechmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ethics and Accountability: The Media Regulation Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On Coase and COVID-19

et al. 2022

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From an epidemiological perspective, the COVID-19 pandemic is a public health crisis. From an economic perspective, it is an externality and a social cost. Strikingly, almost all economic policy to address the infection externality has been formulated within a Pigovian analysis of implicit taxes and subsidies directed by a social planner drawing on social cost-benefit analysis. In this paper we examine the alternative economic methodology of the externality. We seek to understand how an exchange-focused and institutional analysis provides a better understanding of how to minimise social cost. Our Coasean framework allows us to further develop a comparative institutional analysis of the pandemic response.

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The political economy of Australian regulatory reform

et al. 2020

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The problem of regulatory accumulation has increasingly been recognised as a policy problem in its own right. Governments have then devised and implemented regulatory reform policies that directly seek to ameliorate the burdens of regulatory accumulation (e.g. red tape reduction targets). In this paper we examine regulatory reform approaches in Australia through the lens of policy innovation. Our contributions are twofold. We first examine the evolutionary discovery process of regulatory reform policies in Australia (at the federal, intergovernmental, and state levels). This demonstrates a process of policy innovation in regulatory mechanisms and measurements. We then analyse a new measurement of regulatory burden based on text analytics, RegData: Australia. RegData: Australia uses textual analysis to count ‘restrictiveness clauses' in regulation – such as ‘must’, ‘cannot’ and ‘shall’ – thereby developing a new database (RDAU1.0). We place this ‘restrictiveness clauses’ measurement within the context of regulatory policy innovation, and examine the potential for further innovation in regulatory reform mechanisms.

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Subjective Political Economy

Cited by 8 publications

References 93 publications

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On Coase and COVID-19

The political economy of Australian regulatory reform

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