In subjective expected utility (SEU), the decision weights people attach to events are their beliefs about the likelihood of events. Much empirical evidence, inspired by Ellsberg (1961) and others, shows that people prefer to bet on events they know more about, even when their beliefs are held constant. (They are averse to ambiguity, or uncertainty about probability.) We review evidence, recent theoretical explanations, and applications of research on ambiguity and SEU.In the last 40 years the leading theories of choice in economics and psychology have been the expected utility (EU) theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and the subjective expected utility (SEU) theory of Savage (1954). Empirical violations have led to reexaminations of both kinds of theory. In Weber and Camerer (1987), we reviewed the evidence, axioms, and application of alternatives to EU. Here we do the same for SEU.EU assumes that the probabilities of outcomes are known. If preferences follow a set of simple axioms, they can be represented by a real-valued utility function--preferred choices have higher utility numbers--and the utility of a choice is the expected utility of its possible outcomes, weighted by their probabilities.In SEU, probabilities are not necessarily objectively known, so SEU applies more widely than EU. (Indeed, it is hard to think of an important natural decision for which probabilities are objectively known.) In SEU, decision makers choose acts, which have consequences that depend on which of several uncertain "states" occurs. People are *Thanks to