Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War

Farwell, James P.; Rohozinski, Rafal

doi:10.1080/00396338.2011.555586

Cited by 630 publications

(255 citation statements)

References 1 publication

Supporting

Mentioning

234

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…In other words, for every choice of the network matrices, there exist nonzero u 1 and u 2 that are not detectable through the measurements. 4 We now consider a numerical realization of this system. Let the input matrices be B for some arbitrary nonzero signalŪ (s).…”

Section: Illustrative Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5) modeled as a descriptor system as in Section II. Following [9], let the measurements y = Cx be given by the real power injections at all buses, of the real power flows of all branches, and one generator rotor angle (or one bus 4 When these ouput-nulling inputs u1, u2 are regarded as additional loads, then they are entirely sustained by the second and third generator. the measurements data is always detectable by our dynamic detection procedure.…”

Section: Illustrative Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems

Pasqualetti

Dörfler

Bullo

2013

IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr.

1,822

1,166

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Cyber-physical systems are ubiquitous in power systems, transportation networks, industrial process control and critical infrastructures. These systems need to operate reliably in the face of unforeseen failures and external malicious attacks. In this paper (i) we propose a mathematical framework for cyberphysical systems, attacks, and monitors; (ii) we characterize fundamental monitoring limitations from system-theoretic and graph-theoretic perspectives; and (iii) we design centralized and distributed attack detection and identification monitors. Finally, we validate our findings through compelling examples.

show abstract

Section: Illustrative Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Illustrative Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems

Pasqualetti

Dörfler

Bullo

2013

IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr.

1,822

1,166

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Two data-driven observations support this claim (see Figure 1). First, cybersecurity research output sees an almost exponential (Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011;Langner, 2011). Beyond the question whether there is an objective increase in willingness and skill for cyberattacks among political actors, the focus of research on SCADA-systems (as targeted by Stuxnet) and on the infrastructure considered the most "critical" for society (electricity) is intertwined with political interests and sensibilities.…”

Section: Dominant View: Cybersecurity As "Fixing Broken Objects"mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cybersecurity Research Meets Science and Technology Studies

Cavelty

2018

PaG

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article sets out to show how different understandings of technology as suggested by Science and Technology Studies (STS) help reveal different political facets of cybersecurity. Using cybersecurity research as empirical site, it is shown that two separate ways of understanding cybertechnologies are prevalent in society. The primary one sees cybertechnologies as apolitical, flawed, material objects that need to be fixed in order to create more security; the other understands them as mere political tools in the hands of social actors without considering technological (im)possibilities. This article suggests a focus on a third understanding to bridge the uneasy gap between the two others: technology defined as an embodiment of societal knowledge. The article posits that in line with that, the study of cyberpolitics would benefit from two innovations: a focus on cybersecurity as social practice-enacted and stabilized through the circulation of knowledge about vulnerabilities-and a focus on the practices employed in the discovery, exploitation and removal of those vulnerabilities.

show abstract

“…Some examples of these include: i) Russia-Estonia distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks [22]. ii) The use of botnets during the Russia-Georgia war of 2008; Iran Stuxnet worm attack in 2010 [23]. iii) Night dragon targeted attacks on energy companies resulting in the theft of sensitive intellectual property [24].…”

Section: Cyber-warfare and National Readinessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Zero day exploits and national readiness for cyber-warfare

Ibor¹

2018

Nig. J. Tech.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A zero day vulnerability is an unknown exploit that divulges security flaws in software before such a flaw is publicly reported or announced. But how should a nation react to a zero day? This question is a concern for most national governments, and one that requires a systematic approach for its resolution. The securities of critical infrastructure of nations and states have been severally violated by cybercriminals. Nation-state espionage and the possible disruption and circumvention of the security of critical networks has been on the increase. Most of these violations are possible through detectable operational bypasses, which are rather ignored by security administrators. One common instance of a detectable operational bypass is the non-application of periodic security updates and upgrades from software and hardware vendors. Every software is not necessarily in its final state, and the application of periodic updates allow for the patching of vulnerable systems, making them to be secure enough to withstand an exploit. To have control over the security of critical national assets, a nation must be "cyber-ready" through the proper management of vulnerabilities and the deployment of the rightful technology in the cyberspace for hunting, detecting and preventing cyber-attacks and espionage. To this effect, this paper discusses the implications of zero day exploits and highlights the dangers posed by this cankerworm for an unprepared nation. The paper also adopts the defence-in-depth strategy for national readiness and a foolproof system that enforces the security of critical national infrastructure at all levels.

show abstract

Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War

Cited by 630 publications

References 1 publication

Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems

Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems

Cybersecurity Research Meets Science and Technology Studies

Zero day exploits and national readiness for cyber-warfare

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About