2016
DOI: 10.1504/ijicbm.2016.074480
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Study on corporate governance mechanisms

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Cited by 9 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…The biggest threat to corporate governance is the managerial entrenchment effect that may arise from larger managerial ownership could create unbalanced authority over other stakeholders. So, a tradeoff between managerial entrenchment and alignment consequence should be ensured for effective managerial ownership (Mishra and Kapil, 2016). The managerial entrenchment effect could create an agency problem between managers and stockholders.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The biggest threat to corporate governance is the managerial entrenchment effect that may arise from larger managerial ownership could create unbalanced authority over other stakeholders. So, a tradeoff between managerial entrenchment and alignment consequence should be ensured for effective managerial ownership (Mishra and Kapil, 2016). The managerial entrenchment effect could create an agency problem between managers and stockholders.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But, government specialized banks are in the worst financial stability than public and private commercial banks, whereas Islamic banks especially "Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL)" are in utmost sound financial stability rather than all commercial banks and specialized banks in Bangladesh (Ahmad and Hassan, 2007). However, this study narrowed the gap between a trend of an entrenchment effect and the interest alignment effect to AJAR 5,2 identify the level of managerial ownership, because the ownership level of management has a significant impact on the value of the firm (Ullah and Shah, 2014;Mishra and Kapil, 2016;Dixon et al, 2017).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…It is well established that firms differ across ownership structures as to the type of owners (insiders, foreign, institutional) and the type of ownership (whether concentrated or not). Studies by Imam and Malik (2007) and Mishra and Kapil (2016) examined how corporate governance is practiced through ownership structure and how firm's performance as well as its dividend payout policy is influenced by different ownership pattern. It was found that foreign holding is positively and significantly related to the firm performance.…”
Section: Discussion On Findings Kgi 1 -Ownership Structure Of the Companiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the relationship between increased stake for block holders and firm performance is not always monotonically increasing, because after becoming too strong block holders may try to extract benefits more than their proportionate share that includes private benefits of control also (Holderness [37]). Thus, value creation through ownership concentration will be a tradeoff between increased shared benefits created and private extraction of values (Mishra and Kapil [38]).…”
Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, in the situation of greater managerial ownership, managers may act in discretion for utilisation of the surplus generated and may take steps to prolong their stay in the firm (even if it is not justified from value creation perspective termed as managerial entrenchment by Shleifer and Vishny [40]) because of disproportionate power available to them. Thus, the value creation through increased managerial ownership will be a trade-off between entrenchment effect and alignment effect (Mishra and Kapil [38]). However, if their stakes are beyond a threshold level, where they would be in a position to exploit minority shareholders, then, there would be a decrease in firm value (Richter and Chakraborty [43]; Ohadi et al [44]; Sahu [45]; Kakani et al [46]).…”
Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%