In this work, we consider a three sided student-project-resource matching-allocation problem, in which students have preferences on projects, and projects on students. While students are many-to-one matched to projects, indivisible resources are many-to-one allocated to projects whose capacities are thus endogenously determined by the sum of resources allocated to them. Traditionally, this problem is divided into two separate problems: (1) resources are allocated to projects based on some expectations (resource allocation problem), and (2) students are matched to projects based on the capacities determined in the previous problem (matching problem). Although both problems are well-understood, unless the expectations used in the first problem are correct, we obtain a suboptimal outcome. Thus, it is desirable to solve this problem as a whole without dividing it in two.Here, we show that finding a nonwasteful matching is FP NP [log]-hard, and deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP NP -complete. These results involve two new problems of independent interest: P P , shown FP NP [poly]-complete and strongly FP NP [log]-hard, and ∀∃ 4 P , shown strongly NP NP -complete.1 Without these properties, this work is still valid, though a claiming or envious pair (s, p) may not necessarily make sense. 2 For designing a strategyproof mechanism, we assume each ≻ s is private information of s, while the rest of parameters are public. Thus, X does not need to be part of the input, since it is characterized by projects' preferences.