2005
DOI: 10.3386/w11259
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Structural Equations, Treatment Effects and Econometric Policy Evaluation

Abstract: . We thank Jaap Abbring, Richard Blundell and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on the first round reports. We benefited from the close reading of Ricardo Avelino, Jean-Marc Robin, Sergio Urzua, and Weerachart Kilenthong on the second draft. We have benefited from a close reading by Jora Stixrud and Sergio Urzua on the third draft. We have also benefited from comments by an anonymous referee on the second draft of this paper. Sergio Urzua provided valuable research assistance in programming the simul… Show more

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Cited by 422 publications
(808 citation statements)
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“…This object is known as the average treatment effect on the treated, see e.g. Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), and it will be estimated by statistical matching.…”
Section: Econometric Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This object is known as the average treatment effect on the treated, see e.g. Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), and it will be estimated by statistical matching.…”
Section: Econometric Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In our setting, the monotonicity assumption requires that individuals released by a strict judge would also be released by a more lenient judge, and that individuals detained by a lenient judge would also be detained by a stricter judge. If the monotonicity assumption is violated, our two-stage least squares estimates would still be a weighted average of marginal treatment effects, but the weights would not sum to one (Angrist, Imbens, andRubin 1996, Heckman andVytlacil 2005). The monotonicity assumption is therefore necessary to interpret our estimates as a well-defined LATE.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…15 In a series of papers, Heckman, Vytlacil and coauthors (2001, 2005 expand these insights in a number of directions. They demonstrate (Vytlacil, 2002) that the LATE model is equivalent to a selection model under many conditions, that LATE is a discrete approximation to the MTE (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005;Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006) and develop a technique called local instrumental variables that identifies marginal treatment effects (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005;Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006).…”
Section: Downloaded Frommentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When firms respond to corporate law and governance heterogeneously-i.e., when a governance mechanism affects one firm differently from another-then the cures for endogeneity, such as instrumental variables techniques, subsample estimates, or fixed-effects estimators, generate estimates of the effect of various governance strategies for a select group of firms. The relationship of the estimates derived for these subgroups to the average treatment effect (ATE) of a policy is the subject of an extensive literature in econometrics and labor economics (Imbens and Angrist, 1994;Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005;Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006) that has to this point been ignored by the corporate law and governance literature as well as in empirical legal studies, more generally.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%