Structural-demographic analysis of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) collapse in China

Abstract

This paper analyzes the collapse of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) through the lens of the Structural Demographic Theory (SDT), a general framework for understanding the drivers of socio-political instability in state-level societies. Although a number of competing ideas for the collapse have been proposed, none provide a comprehensive explanation that incorporates the interaction of all the multiple drivers involved. We argue that the four-fold population explosion peaking in the 19th century, the growing competition for a stagnant number of elite positions, and increasing state fiscal stress combined to produce an increasingly disgruntled populace and elite, leading to significant internal rebellions. We find that while neither the ecological disasters nor the foreign incursions during the 19th century were sufficient on their own to bring down the Qing, when coupled with the rising internal socio-political stresses, they produced a rapid succession of triggering events that culminated in the Qing collapse.

Navigating polycrisis: long-run socio-cultural factors shape response to changing climate

“…If societal response to environmental stressors is complex and characterized by widely divergent reactions to similar forces, what, then, are the factors that raise or lower vulnerability, in the past as well as today? Building on insights from structural demographic theory (SDT), ongoing research by the Seshat team and other colleagues [29,[31][32][33][34][35] demonstrates that societal pressure rises with the combination of three central structural stressors: popular immiseration, namely declining well-being and living standards for the majority population; the elite overproduction and conflict that arises when a growing number of wealthy and powerful citizens along with aspirant elites vie for limited economic, political and social prestige positions; and state fiscal distress and declining state function as resources are constrained and frustration at poor conditions erodes state legitimacy and capacity. These pressures tend to build over time owing to rising population and unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity, which depresses living standards among large segments of the population and raises the stakes of intra-elite competition.…”

“…These pressures tend to build over time owing to rising population and unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity, which depresses living standards among large segments of the population and raises the stakes of intra-elite competition. Further, as state finances and authority weaken or are corrupted by these same forces, their coordination and conflict-resolution mechanisms become increasingly ineffective, further undermining legitimacy [ 34 ].…”

“…A recent analysis of the Qing, the last Chinese imperial dynasty, reveals clearly how social pressures mediate the impact of environmental forces [ 34 ]. The Qing were a large, economically productive, long-lived regime whose rule stretched from the end of the Ming Dynasty in 1644 until the Republican Revolution in 1911 CE.…”

“…Drought and famine record the number of sites in each year that experienced these shocks; instability is the number of years the Qing engaged in an internal war (civil war, violent uprising) per decade; and PSI is a composite measure of political–social instability, measured as the combined pressure from popular immiseration, elite overproduction, and state insecurity. Adapted from [ 34 ]. (Online version in colour.)…”

Landscape of Fear: Indirect effects of conflict can account for large-scale population declines in non-state societies

“…For historical, large-scale polities (i.e., states and empires), the importance of population growth and decline as both driving forces and outcomes from complex social and political processes has been well appreciated. Structural-demographic models have been especially successful in this regard, explicitly connecting population dynamics and political developments (Turchin and Nefedov 2009;Goldstone 2016;Orlandi et al 2023).…”