Strong quantum solutions in conflicting-interest Bayesian games

Rai, Ashutosh; Paul, Goutam

doi:10.1103/physreva.96.042340

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 39 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In the late 90's quantum versions of it, that is, games in which players share quantum states and actions are translated into unitary operations, were first presented [5,6]. An active and diverse literature has then been established, connecting quantum correlations to various forms of games [7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multistage games and Bell scenarios with communication

et al. 2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Bell nonlocality is a cornerstone of quantum theory with applications in information processing ranging from cryptography to distributed computing and game theory. Indeed, it is known that Bell's theorem can be formally linked to Bayesian games, allowing the use of nonlocal correlations to advise players and thereby achieve new points of equilibrium that are unavailable classically. Here we generalize this link, proving the connection between multistage games of incomplete information with Bell scenarios involving the communication of measurement outcomes between the parties. We apply the general framework for a few cases of interest and analyze the equilibrium reached by quantum nonlocal correlations.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multistage games and Bell scenarios with communication

et al. 2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…[6] just to mention a few. The CHSH game also has a conflict of interest variant [9] which inspired detailed studies of games with a similar equilibrium structure [10][11][12].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ex ante versus ex post equilibria in classical Bayesian games with a nonlocal resource

Koniorczyk,

Bodor,

Pintér

2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyze the difference between ex ante and ex post equilibria in classical games played with the assistance of a nonlocal (quantum or no-signaling) resource. In physics, the playing of these games is known as performing bipartite Bell-type experiments. By analyzing the Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt game, we find a constructive procedure to find two-person Bayesian games with a nonlocal (i.e. no-signaling, and, in many cases, quantum) advantage. Most games of this kind known from the literature can be constructed along this principle, and share the property that their relevant ex ante equilibria are ex post equilibria as well. We introduce a new type of game, based on the Bell-theorem by Vértesi and Bene, which does not have the latter property: the ex ante and ex post equilibria differ.

show abstract

“…For instance, the Eisert-Lewenstein-Wilkens quantum game scheme [9,[13][14][15][16] concentrates on the quantization of strategy negotiation process, where strategy operations are expanded from classical bit operators to unitary quantum gates, and the measurement basis for move decision is assumed to be constant. In contrast, players adjust the measurement basis in Marinatto's scheme [17][18][19][20][21] and Bayesian quantum games [22][23][24][25][26][27][28] to optimize their move decision policies. Entanglement improves players' payoffs and quantum uncertainty keeps the fairness of the game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of honesty and trickery on a Bayesian quantum prisoners’ dilemma game*

Liu¹,

Zhao²,

Hirata³

et al. 2020

Chinese Phys. B

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To explore the influence of quantum information on the common social problem of honesty and trickery, we propose a Bayesian model for the quantum prisoners’ dilemma game. In this model, the players’ strategy formation is regarded as a negotiation of their move contract based on their types of decision policies, honesty or trickery. Although the implementation of quantum information cannot eliminate tricky players, players in our model can always end up with higher payoffs than in the classical game. For a good proportion of a credibility parameter value, a rational player will take an honest action, which is in remarkable contrast to the observation that players tend to defect in the classical prisoners’ dilemma game. This research suggests that honesty will be promoted to enhance cooperation with the assistance of quantum information resources.

show abstract

Strong quantum solutions in conflicting-interest Bayesian games

Cited by 9 publications

References 39 publications

Multistage games and Bell scenarios with communication

Multistage games and Bell scenarios with communication

Ex ante versus ex post equilibria in classical Bayesian games with a nonlocal resource

The impact of honesty and trickery on a Bayesian quantum prisoners’ dilemma game*

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About