Stricter employment protection and firms' incentives to sponsor training: The case of French older workers

Abstract

From French data, this paper uses a difference-indifferences approach combined with propensity score matching to identify the effect of an exogenous change in employment protection among older workers on firm's incentives to sponsor training. Laying off workers aged 50 and above, French firms have to pay a tax to the unemployment insurance system, known as the Delalande tax. In 1999, the measure was subjected to a reform that increased due taxes but that did not concern equally all firms. We find that this exogenous shock to employment protection for older workers substantially rises firms' incentives to train the 45-49 age group of workers. This result confirms predictions of the simple labor market model we develop in a first stage. À partir de données françaises, ce papier utilise une approche de double différence combinée avec la méthode d'appariement sur score de propension pour identifier l'effet d'un changement exogène de la protection de l'emploi des seniors sur les incitations des entreprises à former leurs travailleurs. En France, lorsque les entreprises licencient un salarié de plus de 50 ans, elles doivent payer une taxe contribuant au système d'assurance chômage, connue sous le nom de taxe Delalande. La réforme de 1999 de la taxe Delalande s'est traduite par une augmentation, hétérogène entre les entreprises, de la contribution. Nous trouvons que ce choc exogène sur la protection de l'emploi des seniors a augmenté substantiellement les incitations des entreprises à former leurs travailleurs âgés entre 45-49 ans. Ce résultat confirme les prédictions de notre modèle théorique.

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