Abstract:This study examines the mechanism design problem for public goods in a model with independent private values. We propose a class of informationally robust, dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), and ex post individual rational (EPIR) mechanisms that are asymptotically ex ante budget balanced (AEABB) and asymptotically efficient (AE) as the population grows. The decision rule is constructed in two steps: First, each valuation is transformed with an increasing function and centered to be mean zero. Then … Show more
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