Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms

Abstract

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Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey

“…However, this result from the field can be driven by differences in the priority and cognitive ability of students. Moreover, Schmelzer (2018) found that subjects with very low and very high levels of contingent reasoning, as measured by choices in the two-person beauty contest game, are more likely to report truthfully in RSD and TTC than subjects with intermediate levels of contingent reasoning.…”

“…The main reason is probably that some of the mechanisms are not straightforward to understand, and the instructions for only one mechanism are already quite involved. However, there are two experimental papers (Schmelzer 2016(Schmelzer , 2018) that investigate subjects' preferences over mechanisms. Schmelzer (2016) studies DA with different tie-breaking rules for priorities.…”

Order Symmetry: A New Fairness Criterion for Assignment Mechanisms

“…When implemented via the usual sequential choosing procedure, SD is obviously strategyproof, while TTC has no obviously strategyproof implementation. Given that obvious strategyproofness increasingly appears to be a desirable property for practical application (Schmelzer, 2017;Troyan, 2019), it would be natural to consider the possibility of achieving it in conjunction with order symmetry. Zhou, Lin (1990).…”