Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Obnoxious Facility Location on a Line

Ye, Deshi; Mei, Lili; Zhang, Yong

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-21398-9_4

Cited by 13 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…In their context, the distance between agents and the facility is defined as the utility, and the objective becomes maximizing social welfare. Later on, Ibara and Nagamochi (2012) provide characterizations of deterministic 2-candidate strategyproof mechanisms for the obnoxious facility game and Ye, Mei, and Zhang (2015) study some other objectives (e.g., the sum of squares of agents' utility). A recent survey (Chan et al 2021) offers a comprehensive overview of recent progress from the mechanism design perspective.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While the majority of the related mechanism design studies consider facilities that are pleasant for the agents, a few studies (Cheng, Yu, and Zhang 2013;Ibara and Nagamochi 2012;Ye, Mei, and Zhang 2015) consider locating obnoxious facilities which are undesirable for agents. Indeed, facilities such as nuclear power reactors, landfill sites, and chemical plants are often unpleasant and do not provide service directly to the agents.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategyproof Mechanisms for Group-Fair Obnoxious Facility Location Problems

Li,

Chan

2024

AAAI

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We study the group-fair obnoxious facility location problems from the mechanism design perspective where agents belong to different groups and have private location preferences on the undesirable locations of the facility. Our main goal is to design strategyproof mechanisms that elicit the true location preferences from the agents and determine a facility location that approximately optimizes several group-fair objectives. We first consider the maximum total and average group cost (group-fair) objectives. For these objectives, we propose deterministic mechanisms that achieve 3-approximation ratios and provide matching lower bounds. We then provide the characterization of 2-candidate strategyproof randomized mechanisms. Leveraging the characterization, we design randomized mechanisms with improved approximation ratios of 2 for both objectives. We also provide randomized lower bounds of 5/4 for both objectives. Moreover, we investigate intergroup and intragroup fairness (IIF) objectives, addressing fairness between groups and within each group. We present a mechanism that achieves a 4-approximation for the IIF objectives and provide tight lower bounds.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Group-Fair Obnoxious Facility Location Problems

Li,

Chan

2024

AAAI

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“…Duan et al studied the problem of locating two obnoxious facilities at least distance d apart [9]. Other variants of OFLG have been considered [5,15,20,25]. Agent preferences over the facilities were introduced to FLG in [10] and [28].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Obnoxious Facility Location Game with Dichotomous Preferences

Li,

Plaxton,

Sinha

2021

Preprint

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We consider a facility location game in which n agents reside at known locations on a path, and k heterogeneous facilities are to be constructed on the path. Each agent is adversely affected by some subset of the facilities, and is unaffected by the others. We design two classes of mechanisms for choosing the facility locations given the reported agent preferences: utilitarian mechanisms that strive to maximize social welfare (i.e., to be efficient), and egalitarian mechanisms that strive to maximize the minimum welfare. For the utilitarian objective, we present a weakly group-strategyproof efficient mechanism for up to three facilities, we give a strongly group-strategyproof mechanism that guarantees at least half of the optimal social welfare for arbitrary k, and we prove that no strongly group-strategyproof mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of 5/4 for one facility. For the egalitarian objective, we present a strategyproof egalitarian mechanism for arbitrary k, and we prove that no weakly groupstrategyproof mechanism achieves a o( √ n) approximation ratio for two facilities. We extend our egalitarian results to the case where the agents are located on a cycle, and we extend our first egalitarian result to the case where the agents are located in the unit square.

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“…In the context of approximate mechanism design, this setting was studied most notably by Cheng et al [20], who proposed strategyproof mechanisms for networks, which are based on a majority vote between two prespecified locations. For the line metric and different objectives, the problem was studied by Ye et al [85]. Ibara and Nagamochi [48] provided characterization results for (group) strategyproof mechanisms for some special cases of the problem.…”

Section: Obnoxious Facility Locationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey

Chan

Filos-Ratsikas

et al. 2021

Preprint

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The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due to its practical importance in various domains, such as social planning and clustering. At a high level, the goal is to design mechanisms to select a set of locations on which to build a set of facilities, aiming to optimize some social objective and ensure desirable properties based on the preferences of strategic agents, who might have incentives to misreport their private information such as their locations. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the significant progress that has been made since the introduction of the problem, highlighting the different variants and methodologies, as well as the most interesting directions for future research.

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Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Obnoxious Facility Location on a Line

Cited by 13 publications

References 20 publications

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Group-Fair Obnoxious Facility Location Problems

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Group-Fair Obnoxious Facility Location Problems

The Obnoxious Facility Location Game with Dichotomous Preferences

Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey

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