Strategy and Misdirection in Forced Choice Memory Performance Testing in Deception Detection

Abstract

We examined forced choice memory performance testing in deception detection from a theoretical perspective. Evidence suggests that participants form different strategies to defeat this test. We attempted to describe these strategies within the framework of Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, a theory that distinguishes strategies based on their degree of anticipation of opponents' strategies. Additionally, we explored whether the strategy selection process is malleable. Truth tellers and liars were subjected to a forced choice memory test about a mock crime. Additionally, half of the sample was subjected to a misdirection changing the appearance of the test to that of a polygraph examination. We found detection accuracies and strategies similar to previous experiments and our misdirection manipulation elicited new strategies and behaviour. Theoretical and practical applications are discussed.

Effects of time pressure on strategy selection and strategy execution in forced choice tests

“…We found no evidence that time pressure affects strategy selection. Although participants in the time pressure condition responded faster, examinees did not differ in the frequencies of self‐reported response strategies, and these frequencies matched those found in other experiments (see Orthey et al, ; Orthey et al, ). Yet further exploration suggests that time pressure did lead to significantly more extreme test scores in examinees with concealed knowledge who reported using level 2 strategies.…”

“…Examinees' responses to the open‐ended question were coded into distinct strategy levels (0, 1, and 2; see Orthey et al, ; Orthey et al, ). These strategy levels define the self‐reported selection strategy of the examinee based on their belief over the tests' detection mechanism.…”

“…Empirical research suggests that examinees with concealed knowledge can successfully be detected at rates varying from 40% to 60% while maintaining a low false positive rate at around 5% (Giger, Merten, Merckelbach, & Oswald, ; Jelicic, Merckelbach, & van Bergen, ; Meijer, Smulders, Johnston, & Merckelbach, ; Merckelbach, Hauer, & Rassin, ; Orthey, Vrij, Leal, & Blank, ; Shaw, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Hillman, ). This detection accuracy is directly related to the prevalence of three different self‐reported response patterns that examinees with concealed knowledge use to avoid being detected by the test (Orthey et al, ; Orthey, Vrij, Meijer, Leal, & Blank, ). These response patterns are defined in terms of hierarchical strategy levels and specify how answer alternatives are selected depending on the examinees' beliefs about the test's detection mechanism (Orthey et al, ; Orthey et al, ).…”

“…This detection accuracy is directly related to the prevalence of three different self‐reported response patterns that examinees with concealed knowledge use to avoid being detected by the test (Orthey et al, ; Orthey, Vrij, Meijer, Leal, & Blank, ). These response patterns are defined in terms of hierarchical strategy levels and specify how answer alternatives are selected depending on the examinees' beliefs about the test's detection mechanism (Orthey et al, ; Orthey et al, ). Examinees using a level 0 strategy form no belief about the test's detection mechanism and comply with the test instructions to select the correct answer alternatives.…”

“…As such, the strategy an examinee selects is not necessarily the optimal strategy but rather a strategy that is “good enough” given the available cognitive resources (also known as satisficing; see Simon, ). Previous research indicates that a large proportion of examinees have sufficient cognitive resources available to discern the test's mechanism and to devise an appropriate counterstrategy (see Orthey et al, ; Orthey et al, ). Thus, if one could limit the cognitive resources available to examinees, this would reduce the frequency of higher order strategies (e.g., level 2).…”