Strategies of Repression

Abstract

Strategies of repression vary widely between extrajudicial and judicial extremes, from unrestrained acts of violence to highly routinized legal procedures. While the former have received a great deal of scholarly attention, judicial methods remain relatively understudied. When and why do rulers repress their rivals in court? The author argues that autocrats use a judicial strategy of repression when confronting challengers from within the ruling elite. Unlike regime outsiders, who pose a common, external threat to mobilize against, insiders present a more divisive target. When autocrats confront the latter, a judicial strategy legitimizes punishment, deters future rivals, and generates shared beliefs regarding incumbent strength and challenger weakness. Using original data on political prisoners in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, the author finds that autocrats were significantly more likely to use a judicial strategy against insiders and an extrajudicial strategy against outsiders. A case study of Kenya traces the logic of the theory, showing how intraregime conflict made courts a valuable instrument of state repression. The findings demonstrate how courts can play a central role in autocratic survival.

Co-ethnic bias and policing in an electoral authoritarian regime: Experimental evidence from Uganda

“…Repression by these institutions negatively affects public perceptions of their legitimacy, undermining people’s trust in them (Curtice, 2021). Other institutions like the courts use their power in more indirect ways to punish political opponents (Magaloni, 2008; Shen-Bayh, 2018). As a consequence, some individuals – especially those opposed to the political status quo – distrust not only the autocrat but also these various institutions.…”

“…In the United States, there is a wide gap between how much Black, Native American, and Latinx individuals trust and support the police compared to white individuals, as minoritized communities are less likely to express trust in the police(Garofalo, 1977;Huang & Vaughn, 1996;Schuman, 1997;Tyler, 2005).4 SeeMagaloni (2008);Shen-Bayh (2018).…”

Clouds with silver linings: how mobilization shapes the impact of coups on democratization

“…In the absence of mass mobilization, we expect autocracy and autocratic survival strategies to dominate. Without a threat from mass mobilization or a clear need to seek broader external support, both leaders that have come to power through a coup and surviving incumbents are more likely to focus on containing potential coup-makers and minimizing threats from within the elite (Shen-Bayh, 2018). Likely tactics such as purges or efforts to accommodate through selective rents will often be associated with greater autocracy.…”

State Repression and Democratic Dispensation in Uganda 1996–2016

“…Shen-Bayh (2018) argued that democratically elected governments that consider staying in power than expected use government institutions such as courts to restrict opposition from accessing political power through democratic processes. Oliver and Ostwald (2018) stressed further that the incumbent government, which is in control of state institutions, influences citizens’ political behavior in its favor.…”