Strategies for Effective Management of Unsolicited Public–Private Partnership Proposals

Osei‐Kyei, Robert; Chan, Albert P.C.; Dansoh, Ayirebi; Ofori-Kuragu, Joseph Kwame; Oppong, Goodenough D.

doi:10.1061/(asce)me.1943-5479.0000598

Cited by 31 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…If the public does not participate in the project, it will not benefit from the service and incur participation costs. Therefore, the trade-off between cost and benefit is the main influencing factor of public participation [28]. When the PPP project brings losses to the public, the government should provide corresponding compensation.…”

Section: Analysis Of Game Players' Relationshipsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

Gao

2020

Sustainability

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The government, investors, and the public have formed a dynamic multi-game relationship on the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) project, but few studies include them in a system to study their win–win solutions. Firstly, we constructed a tripartite game model of the government, investors, and the public based on evolutionary game theory. Secondly, the evolutionary process of tripartite strategy behaviors was studied with the system dynamics (SD) model. Finally, the impact of changes in key factors on behavior strategies was studied through sensitivity analysis. The results show the following: (1) In the outsourcing of new energy and power construction PPP projects, the three parties will eventually reach the equilibrium state of {government supervision, public participation, investors effort}, the three parties achieve a win–win situation and the project benefits are the highest at this time, and the public participation will play an important role in promoting the smooth outsourcing of PPP projects. (2) The strategic choices of the government, investors, and the public are sensitive to changes in the corresponding exogenous variables. (3) The security factor plays a crucial role in the choice of public strategy. The public’s choice is not only affected by its own income and cost, but also by the amount of compensation promised by the government and the estimated damage caused by the investor.

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Section: Analysis Of Game Players' Relationshipsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

Gao

2020

Sustainability

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“…Analysis of literature on the formation and implementation of PPP mechanism [6][7][8][9][10][11] allows to formulate the features of PPP, namely:…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A rationale for choosing the mechanism of public-private partnership for the sustainable development of social infrastructure facilities

2018

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Using the mechanism of public-private partnership (PPP) is an effective way to attract investment for the modernization of urban infrastructure in the face of budget shortfalls, which is especially important for the sustainable development of the social infrastructure of the territories. The aim of the study is to analyze the models of public-private partnership (PPP) and substantiate the choice of the model to ensure sustainable development of the social sphere. The life-cycle cost (LLC) model is represented as the most effective one for realizing municipal facilities development projects.

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“…The pre-defined criteria were that: the respondent should have adequate industrial (i.e. at least one PPP project) and/or research (at least one publication on PPP) experience in PPP project delivery; and the respondent should have general knowledge on unsolicited PPP proposals (Osei-Kyei et al , 2017a). …”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Motivations for adopting unsolicited proposals for public-private partnership project implementation

Osei‐Kyei

Chan

Dansoh

et al. 2018

JFMPC

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Purpose The purpose of this study is to explore the motivations of governments for adopting unsolicited proposals for public–private partnership (PPP) project implementation. Design/methodology/approach A comprehensive review of literature was conducted to derive a list of motivations for adopting unsolicited PPPs. Subsequently, an empirical questionnaire survey was conducted with international PPP experts. Inter-rater agreement analysis, mean significance index and independent two-sample t-test were used for data analysis. Findings Results reveal four very critical motivations for governments’ interest in unsolicited PPPs; these include: “enhanced private sector innovation and creativity in PPPs”; “lack of public sector capacity to identify, prioritise and procure projects”; “lack of private investors’/developers’ interest in projects at remote areas”; and “rapid implementation of PPP projects”. Further analysis shows that developing and developed countries view the significance of three motivations differently. Research limitations/implications The major limitation lies in the fact that this study only focused on the general motivations/rationale for using unsolicited PPP proposals and did not thoroughly examine and consider the inherent property of motivations (i.e. push and pull theories). Therefore, future studies should explore the “pull and push” motivations for adopting unsolicited PPPs within a specific country or region. Originality/value The research outputs inform international private developers of the key expectations of governments/public departments when submitting unsolicited PPP proposals for consideration by the public sector. Furthermore, the outputs will enable governments/public departments and private proponents to derive performance objectives and standards for unsolicited PPP projects.

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Strategies for Effective Management of Unsolicited Public–Private Partnership Proposals

Cited by 31 publications

References 36 publications

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

A rationale for choosing the mechanism of public-private partnership for the sustainable development of social infrastructure facilities

Motivations for adopting unsolicited proposals for public-private partnership project implementation

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