Strategies for Combating Dark Networks

Abstract

Our goal in this paper is to explore two generic approaches to disrupting dark networks: kinetic and nonkinetic. The kinetic approach involves aggressive and offensive measures to eliminate or capture network members and their supporters, while the non-kinetic approach involves the use of subtle, non-coercive means for combating dark networks. Two strategies derive from the kinetic approach: Targeting and Capacity-building. Four strategies derive from the non-kinetic approach: Institution-Building, Psychological Operations, Information Operations and Rehabilitation. We use network data from Noordin Top's South East Asian terror network to illustrate how both kinetic and non-kinetic strategies could be pursued depending on a commander's intent. Using this strategic framework as a backdrop, we strongly advise the use of SNA metrics in developing alterative counter-terrorism strategies that are contextdependent rather than letting SNA metrics define and drive a particular strategy.

Women’s connectivity in extreme networks

“…Hence, the high average BC for women suggests that women can, on average, play a more central role in passing items such as recruitment messages, files, prayers, and video and audio propaganda; brokering distant parts of the network (for example, aligning narratives); and channeling funds. This importance of high BC was recently noted by Roberts and Everton (18), who state that intelligence officers in northern Iraq successfully identified "… actors in an insurgent network who scored high in terms of betweenness centrality (BC) as information insertion points. The effort was … successful in rolling up the insurgency."…”

“…Such a high BC can bring global benefits to the network because the BC of a node measures the fraction of shortest paths from all nodes to all others that pass through that given node. Shortest paths between members in covert networks are considered crucial for passing items between any two nodes, because every extra step represents extra risk and potential cost (17)(18)(19)(20). Hence, the high average BC for women suggests that women can, on average, play a more central role in passing items such as recruitment messages, files, prayers, and video and audio propaganda; brokering distant parts of the network (for example, aligning narratives); and channeling funds.…”

Networks and Religion: Ties that Bind, Loose, Build Up, and Tear Down

“…Tie strength ranges from 0 to 3, where 0 indicates the absence of a tie, 1, acquaintances and distant family ties, 2, friends and moderately close family ties, and 3, close friends and family. Although there are some limitations to the data (see Gerdes, 2015), which is not unusual with data on covert and illegal networks (Borgatti et al, 2006;Krebs, 2002;Roberts and Everton, 2011;Sparrow, 1991), they appear to reflect other accounts of the cell (9/11 Commission, 2004;Sageman, 2004). The figures were created in R using the igraph library (Csárdi and Nepusz, 2006).…”

Mapping Global Cyberterror Networks: An Empirical Study of Al-Qaeda and ISIS Cyberterrorism Events

“…Since then, multiple studies have utilized traditional criminal and terror network structures to analyze terrorism (Carley, 2005; Campana, 2016; Grund & Densley, 2015; Gunnell et al, 2016; Kelly & McCarthy-Jones, 2021; Krebs, 2002; Mastrobuoni & Patacchini, 2012; Perliger & Pedahzur, 2011). Various terrorist individuals and groups have been examined so far, including Al-Qaeda (e.g., Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008; Enders & Su, 2007), Neo-Jihadist Terrorism (Harris-Hogan, 2012), ego networks of five lone actor attacks in Australia (Bright et al, 2020), Noordin Top’s terrorist network in Southeast Asia (Roberts & Everton, 2011), the Jemaah Islamiyah cell for the 2002 Bali bombings (Koschade, 2007), and terrorists in the Malian conflict (Walther & Christopoulos, 2014).…”