1999
DOI: 10.2307/3380931
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Strategies for Avoiding the Pitfalls of Performance Contracting

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Cited by 126 publications
(93 citation statements)
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References 12 publications
(2 reference statements)
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“…Block et al (2002) explain that fee-for-service funding can have the unintended effect of encouraging inefficiencies by rewarding service providers for the provision of additional services rather than outcomes achieved, in other words, accountability is focused on service provision rather than outcomes. While studies do point to better vocational outcomes with outcome-based funding (McGrew et al 2005) some critics have expressed concern about the unintended consequences and incentives that accompany this funding model as well, claiming that it can discourage service providers from working with harder-to-serve individuals who experience more complex issues (Behn and Kant 1999;Corden and Thornton 2003;Frumkin 2001;O'Brien and Revell 2005;Rapp 2002), because service providers are not guaranteed that funding will be provided unless they achieve the agreed upon client outcomes (McGrew et al 2007;O'Brien and Revell 2005).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Block et al (2002) explain that fee-for-service funding can have the unintended effect of encouraging inefficiencies by rewarding service providers for the provision of additional services rather than outcomes achieved, in other words, accountability is focused on service provision rather than outcomes. While studies do point to better vocational outcomes with outcome-based funding (McGrew et al 2005) some critics have expressed concern about the unintended consequences and incentives that accompany this funding model as well, claiming that it can discourage service providers from working with harder-to-serve individuals who experience more complex issues (Behn and Kant 1999;Corden and Thornton 2003;Frumkin 2001;O'Brien and Revell 2005;Rapp 2002), because service providers are not guaranteed that funding will be provided unless they achieve the agreed upon client outcomes (McGrew et al 2007;O'Brien and Revell 2005).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Schemes for triggering financial incentives include the milestones method used in Oklahoma, Alabama, and New York (Gates et al, 2004); outcome-based incentive financing used in New Hampshire and Colorado (Rapp, 2002;Rapp, Huff, & Hansen, 2003), or performance contracting (Behn & Kant, 1999). Ohio doubled the rate of employment by providing financial incentives tied directly to employment (Hogan, 1999).…”
Section: Task 5: Create Incentives and Disincentivesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…CTC is argued to create a need for investing in contract-management capacity (Brown and Potoski, 2003a). For services of low measurability, contracting challenges are more probable (Behn and Kant, 1999), and the need for contract-management capacity will be especially prominent. It is argued that the more measureable services are the most likely to be successfully organized through contracting Graddy, 1986, 1991).…”
Section: Improving Public Services Through Competition: Theoretical Amentioning
confidence: 99%