Strategic vote trading under complete information

Xefteris, Dimitrios; Ziros, Nicholas

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.009

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…The author used a statistical model called mixed logit regression to develop a forecasting system that has been widely used in the field. Xefteris and Ziros [48] examined the possibility of strategic vote trading, where individuals trade their votes with each other to maximize their utility under complete information. The authors showed that strategic vote trading can be an efficient method for allocating votes under certain conditions.…”

Section: Mathematical Modeling Of Indian Political Electionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analyzing election trends incorporating memory effect through a fractional-order mathematical modeling

Santra,

Mahapatra

2024

Phys. Scr.

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This study proposes a new mathematical model to analyze and predict the results of a political election. In general, we predict or analyze the results using statistical methods; however, to minimize the effort of the study, we propose a fractional-order modeling approach. This study proposes a model to analyze and predict general election result trends in India, focusing on the state of West Bengal. To incorporate memory into the model, we consider the Caputo fractional derivative. The model solution's positivity, boundedness, existence, and uniqueness were tested analytically. Numerical simulations were carried out to investigate the impact of the parameters and evaluate the model's performance by incorporating the implications of the previous election for realistic situations. Following this, a qualitative analysis of the performance of political parties is discussed, and a prediction of the electoral victory is obtained.

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Section: Mathematical Modeling Of Indian Political Electionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analyzing election trends incorporating memory effect through a fractional-order mathematical modeling

Santra,

Mahapatra

2024

Phys. Scr.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Technically, the assumption removes the discontinuity of the outcome at α = 1/2, and thus the discontinuity in the value of a vote at pivotality. Under either complete (Xefteris & Ziros, 2018) or incomplete (Xefteris & Ziros, 2017) information about preferences, an equilibrium exists where all voters are trading -on each side, voters with lower valuations sell their votes while voters with higher valuation buy votes. The welfare properties of this full-trade equilibrium depend on the informational environment.…”

Section: Strategic Market Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?

Casella

Macé

2021

Annu. Rev. Econ.

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Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others’ votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are weak. But is vote trading welfare improving or welfare decreasing? For a practice long believed to be central to collective decisions, the lack of a clear answer is surprising. We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling, the exchange of votes for votes. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions—that is, allowing one to trade votes with oneself only. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Economics, Volume 13 is August 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

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“…Under either complete (Xefteris & Ziros, 2018) or incomplete (Xefteris & Ziros, 2017) information about preferences, an equilibrium exists where all voters are trading -on each side, voters with lower valuations sell their votes while voters with higher valuation buy votes. The welfare properties of this full-trade equilibrium depend on the informational environment.…”

Section: Strategic Market Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare ?

Casella

Macé

2020

SSRN Journal

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Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, a practice indeed believed to be common. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling-the exchange of votes for votes, considering both explicit vote exchanges and implicit vote trades engineered by bundling issues in a single bill. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We cover competitive markets, strategic market games, decentralized bargaining, and more centralized mechanisms, such as quadratic voting, where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions-to trade votes with oneself only-such as storable votes or a modified form of quadratic voting. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions.

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Strategic vote trading under complete information

Cited by 4 publications

References 29 publications

Analyzing election trends incorporating memory effect through a fractional-order mathematical modeling

Analyzing election trends incorporating memory effect through a fractional-order mathematical modeling

Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?

Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare ?

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