Strategic Vote Choice in One-round and Two-round Elections

Abstract

The authors test a model of strategic vote choice in which the decision to support or not to support a candidate depends on the benefit associated with the election of a given candidate and the candidate's perceived viability. They test the model with data collected in a series of experiments in which the participants voted in eight successive elections, four in one round and four in two rounds. Results show that the same model applies to both voting systems, although the impact of perceived viability is slightly weaker in two-round elections. The authors conclude that strategic considerations are almost as important in two-round as in one-round elections.

Winning from the Center: Frank Bigelow and California's Nonpartisan Primary

“…Referencing Cox (1997, 137), Blais et al (2011, 638) observe that voters need to be able to assess the likelihood of all available possible pairings, and the consequences from those, in a two-round election; consequently "strategic considerations should play a weaker role." In French presidential elections they find little evidence of voters abandoning their first choice, which have a similar structure (Blais 2004, Blais et al 2011. 19 In their view, facing a complex and uncertain choice, sincere voting may be a very reasonable strategy.…”

Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections

“…These effects are less influential than the mechanical effects traditionally attributed to the electoral rule relative to the number of parties (e.g., on the larger number of parties taking part in a proportional system). Blais et al (2010) focus specifically on the effects of one-and two-round polls on voters' strategic behavior (i.e., 5 Vote functions have been studied in the yardstick competition literature which assumes that voters are sensitive to neighbor cities' choices. Tests of this hypothesis, in line with the seminal paper by Besley and Case (1995), rely on the estimation of tax reaction functions, and show its relevance most of the time.…”

Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry Under Plurality and Majority Runoff

“…Duverger (1951) argues that the difference is due to voting behaviour, as, he says, there are more strategic voters in plurality than in majority runoff elections. However, recent studies show that voters engage in strategic voting to almost the same extent under both electoral systems (Abramson et al 2010;Blais et al 2011; Van der Straeten et al 2010). Thus, the difference should be due to another factor.…”

“…There are more competing candidates under majority runoff because fewer voters engage in strategic voting under this electoral system. Observational and experimental 2 studies show that the type and proportion of strategic voting differ somewhat in plurality and majority runoff systems (Abramson et al 2010;Blais et al 2011;Van der Straeten et al 2010). Optimal strategic voting under majority runoff requires more complex strategies than the bare desertion of non--viable candidates.…”

“…Optimal strategic voting under majority runoff requires more complex strategies than the bare desertion of non--viable candidates. Recent laboratory experiments show that strategic voters rarely use sophisticated strategies (Blais et al 2011;Van der Straeten et al this volume).…”