Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Konrad, Kai A.

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(95)80008-w

Cited by 76 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…That is, we assume a simple cartel formation game and apply the concept of internal and external stability. We do not consider commitments or any complication like non-transferable utility (Buchholz and Konrad 1995), monitoring and moral hazard problems (Petrakis and Xepapadeas 1996); "reputation effects" (Jeppesen and Andersen;Hoel and Schneider 1997) are also discarded in favour of the notion of optimal transfer schemes. With optimal transfers we mean transfers designed to maximize global welfare under the constraint that the underlying IEA is self-enforcing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

2005

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

2005

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“…As Buchholz and Konrad (1995) demonstrate, unconditional income redistribution may help to address cost-effectiveness problems in public good provision. Transfers channeled from a country which is less productive in mitigating climate change towards a country which is more productive, will induce an international reallocation of mitigation activities.…”

Section: Allocation Aspects (C+d)mentioning

confidence: 99%

International support of climate change policies in developing countries: Strategic, moral and fairness aspects

Rübbelke

2011

Ecological Economics

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“…Guttman 1978;Buchholz & Konrad 1995;Andreoni & Varian 1999;Charness et al 2007;Bracht et al 2008). In the following, whenever we talk about matching we refer to one-sided matching.…”

Section: Fundamentals Of Matching Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Matching Schemes and Public Goods: A Review

Epperson

Reif

2017

SSRN Journal

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Abstract: Matching schemes and public goods: A reviewMatching schemes, where a party matches the contribution of others, reduce the effective price of a good and aim to foster its demand. We review the empirical literature on the effectiveness of these schemes in the context of public goods, especially in the field of charitable giving. As different measures of effectiveness are used, we classify results according to (i) the level of public good provision, (ii) the amount of individuals' contributions, (iii) the likelihood to give and (iv) the contribution conditional on contributing a positive amount. Generalizing results is challenging, since context specific factors matter. Predominantly, a match is found to create a significant increase in public good provision without crowding out individuals' contributions, while the effect on the likelihood of giving and contribution condition on contributing a positive amount is nonnegative. The discussion reveals several avenues for future research, as putting stronger emphasizes on long term effects, public good competition or heterogeneity in responses. JEL-Code: D01, D64, H41, L31

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Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods

Cited by 76 publications

References 18 publications

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

International support of climate change policies in developing countries: Strategic, moral and fairness aspects

Matching Schemes and Public Goods: A Review

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