Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams

Cox, Caleb; Stoddard, Brock

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.03.007

Cited by 28 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 73 publications

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“…Games are generally used to entertain individuals [14], however, they are also widely used in education domain in recent years since they improve the strategic thinking skills of individuals [15]. In addition, they also increase the motivation of the participants so that the learning process of the individuals on a new topic accelerates [16].…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

CENGO: A Web-Based Serious Game to Increase the Programming Knowledge Levels of Computer Engineering Students

Güleç

Yılmaz

Yalcin

et al. 2019

Communications in Computer and Information Science

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In recent years, games are used to increase the level of knowledge and experience of individuals working in different domains. Especially in the education field, there are several different serious games to teach the subjects of the lectures or other educational materials to students in an enjoyable way. Hence, this study proposes a quantitative research approach to increase the programming knowledge levels of the first-year undergraduate students at computer engineering departments. For this aim, a responsive web platform was developed to teach the syntax and logic of C programming language by using some game elements. Therefore, the students have a chance to repeat the topics related to C programming language continuously since the platform is always accessible. To figure out the efficiency of the designed environment, 10 first-year computer engineering students were selected. According to the results obtained from the user tests, this game can be used as an educational tool, which supports the traditional training methods, to increase the knowledge levels of students about the syntax and logic of C programming language.

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Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

CENGO: A Web-Based Serious Game to Increase the Programming Knowledge Levels of Computer Engineering Students

Güleç

Yılmaz

Yalcin

et al. 2019

Communications in Computer and Information Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Importantly, this suggests that the agreement was unanimous. Following recent research investigating strategic thinking within PGGs we code Leadership as time-invariant (Cox and Stoddard, 2017). That is, if unanimous agreement was reached we assumed that it had long lasting effects imposed monitoring (1.33 vs. 0.57 (WRS: p = 0.35)), average contributions (16.21 vs. 17.36 (WRS: p = 0.94)), or average earnings (34.12 vs. 36.60 (WRS: p = 0.52)).…”

Section: Analysis Of Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

More Talk, Less Need for Monitoring: Communication and Deterrence in a Public Good Game

Kingsley

Muise

2017

J Exp Polit Sci

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This paper investigates the impact of communication in a public good game with a central authority. The central authority includes a fixed cost that increases with the level of monitoring which in turn determines the level of deterrence. The level of monitoring is both exogenously and endogenously determined. Across three treatments subjects either have no opportunity to communicate, communicate only when the level of monitoring is exogenously imposed, or communicate only when the level of monitoring is endogenously selected. Results suggest that, in both treatments, average earnings are significantly higher with the opportunity to communicate. Most significantly, with the opportunity to communicate prior to endogenous selection, groups practically eliminate monitoring (imposing a low cost, nondeterrent, central authority), while maintaining a high level of contributions. Communication appears to make groups less dependent on institutional deterrence and allows them to reduce the costs of central authority.On the other hand, one significant disadvantage is that, unlike peer punishment, which is only costly when used, central authority regimes are costly regardless of observed behavior. For example, consider how speed limits are enforced. Groups at some level (town, county, or state), decide to collectively fund a police force to monitor the behavior of drivers. Regardless of behavior, deploying police officers is costly. Again, the literature suggests that groups understand this trade-off and selfimpose peer punishment whenever the central authority imposes a modest fixed cost (Markussen et al., 2013;Kamei et al., 2015).Beyond the role of institutions, researchers have also investigated the impact of communication on cooperation. While the importance of communication in establishing cooperation is intuitive, standard economic theory predicts that non-binding communication will have no impact on behavior (Olson, 1965). However, communication has been shown to have strong, and robust, positive effects on the level of cooperation in social dilemmas (Sally, 1995). While the reasons for communications' success remain debated there is largely consensus around two prominent mechanisms: fostering group identity and eliciting credible commitments to cooperate (Mendelberg, 2002;Bicchieri, 2002).In the CPR games devised by Ostrom et al. (1992), the combination of communication and peer punishment most effectively increased earnings. Ostrom et al. (1992) find that this combination was effective because communication allowed groups to develop, and credibly commit to, welfare-improving strategies that enhanced cooperation and reduced the instances of misplaced punishment. 5 In the public goods literature, the interaction of communication and peer punishment has been shown to be similarly effective (Bochet et al., 2006).In the design implemented here, the deterrence is manipulated by altering the probability that the central authority observes a subject's contribution, holding the magnitude of punishment constant. The fixed cos...

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“…Group effects such as spite, competitiveness, retribution, alongside compassion, prosociality and altruism have all been shown to alter the magnitude of adherence to norms in the context of decisions that cater toward a public good (Levin, 2014). Finally the likelihood of altruistic behavior (i.e., higher contributions to public goods) is Increased when decisions are not made Individually but as a team (Coxb and Stoddard, 2016). Altogether, prior works point to a delicate balance between the individual's self-interest of maximizing their utility and their desire to adhere to social norms that signal cooperation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In line with this proposition, empirical evidence shows that decision making at various social structures (e.g., companies or countries) becomes more efficient when these structures show greater levels of trust among individuals (e.g., employees, or citizens). For example, research has demonstrated that high levels of trust between business partners or firms is associated with a more pronounced focus on long-term relationships, higher levels of cooperation, and higher relationship satisfaction (Fukuyama, 1995;Coxb and Stoddard, 2016). Likewise, higher levels of trust on a country-level are related to a higher likelihood of citizens complying with the country's laws (Jones, 2015), higher levels of prosociality (Zak and Knack, 2001), as well as higher GDP (Bjørnskov, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using Blockchain to Improve Decision Making That Benefits the Public Good

2020

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Human decision making is often prone to biases and irrationality. Group decisions add dynamic interactions that further complicate the choice process and frequently result in outcomes that are suboptimal for both the individual and the collective. We show that an implementation of a Blockchain protocol improves individuals' decision strategies and increases the alignment between desires and outcomes. The Blockchain protocol affords (1) a distributed decision, (2) the ability to iterate repeatedly over a choice, (3) the use of feedback and corrective inputs, and (4) the quantification of intrinsic choice attributes (i.e., greed, desire for fairness, etc.). We test our protocol's performance in the context of the Public Goods Game. The game, a generalized version of the Prisoner's Dilemma, allows players to maximize their own gain or act in ways that benefit the collective. Empirical evidence shows that participants' cooperation in the game typically decreases once a single player favors their own interest at the expense of others'. In our Blockchain implementation, "smart contracts" are used to safeguard individuals against losses and, consequently, encourage contributions to the public good. Across different tested simulations, the Blockchain protocol increases both the overall trust among the participants and their profits. Agents decision strategies remain flexible while they act as each other's source of accountability (which can be seen as formalized distributed "Ulysses contract"). To highlight the contribution of our protocol to society at large we incorporated an entity that represents the public good. This benevolent independent beneficiary of the contributions of all participants (e.g., a charity organization or a tax system) maximized its payoffs when the Blockchain protocol was implemented. We provide a formalized implementation of the Blockchain protocol and discuss potential applications that could benefit society by more accurately capturing individuals' preferences. For example, the protocol could help maximize profits in groups, facilitate democratic election that better reflect the public opinion, or enable group decision in circumstances where a balance between anonymity, diverse opinions, personal preferences and loss-aversion play a role.

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Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams

Cited by 28 publications

References 73 publications

CENGO: A Web-Based Serious Game to Increase the Programming Knowledge Levels of Computer Engineering Students

CENGO: A Web-Based Serious Game to Increase the Programming Knowledge Levels of Computer Engineering Students

More Talk, Less Need for Monitoring: Communication and Deterrence in a Public Good Game

Using Blockchain to Improve Decision Making That Benefits the Public Good

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