Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study

Straeten, Karine Van der; Laslier, Jean‐François; Sauger, Nicolas; Blais, André

doi:10.1007/s00355-010-0448-7

Cited by 73 publications

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“…For a given set of electoral preferences, different voting rules may elect or favor distinct candidates (Forsythe et al 1996;Van der Straeten et al 2010; Igersheim 2011a, 2011b 2 As well as these, two voting experiments were conducted via the Internet during the 2012 French presidential elections. The site Voteaupluriel.org was set up under the supervision of Blais, Laslier, and Van der Straeten, following a similar experiment conducted alongside the Canadian elections in 2011 (threeontariovotes.org).…”

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Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election

et al. 2014

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Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment which used various evaluation scales, conducted during the first round of the 2012 French presidential election. Invitations to participate in the study were extended to around 5,000 voters in three cities, and the experiment attracted 2,340 participants. Basing our argument on the * We extend grateful thanks to all the members of the Community Councils, all the participants, and all the volunteers who helped us on April 22.(See http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/spip.php?rubrique94#Merci).† GATE L-SE (UMR CNRS 5824), University Jean Monnet, 42 000 Saint-Etienne, France, antoinette.baujard@univ-st-etienne.fr ‡ CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), University of Caen Basse-Normandie, 14 000 Caen, France, frederic.gavrel@unicaen.fr § CNRS and Beta (UMR CNRS 7522), University of Strasbourg, 67 085 Strasbourg,France, igersheim@unistra.fr ¶ PREG (UMR CNRS 7176), Ecole polytechnique, 91 128 Palaiseau, France, jeanfrancois.laslier@polytechnique.edu CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), University of Caen Basse-Normandie, 14 000 Caen, France isabelle.lebon@unicaen.fr 1 ranks, relative scores, and grade profiles of candidates, we show that the two-round system favors "exclusive" candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor "inclusive" candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons: the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the official, two-round voting rule. Classification JEL: D72, C93Keywords: Voting, In Situ Experiment, Evaluative Voting, Approval Voting, Two-round system Highlights• The two-round system favors "exclusive" candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings.• Evaluative rules favor "inclusive" candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate.• One explanation of the differences between the elections wins and rankings between the two-round system and evaluative voting rules is that the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules.• One explanation of the differences between the elections wins and rankings between the two-round system and evaluative voting rules relies in the specific pattern of strategic voting under the official, two-round voting rule. 2A voting rule is supposed to be able to determine the candidate most favored by a community of voters. However, it is a well-established conclusion of social choice theory that voting by itself is mathematically incapable of picking the single and uncontroversial winner of an election (Arrow 1957).For a given set of electoral preferences, different voting rules may elect or favor distinct candidates (F...

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“…For a given set of electoral preferences, different voting rules may elect or favor distinct candidates (Forsythe et al 1996; Van der Straeten et al 2010;Igersheim 2011a, 2011b). However, little research has thus far been conducted on the kinds of winners, or the different types of rankings, which are induced by different voting rules.…”

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Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election

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“…There are more competing candidates under majority runoff because fewer voters engage in strategic voting under this electoral system. Observational and experimental 2 studies show that the type and proportion of strategic voting differ somewhat in plurality and majority runoff systems (Abramson et al 2010;Blais et al 2011;Van der Straeten et al 2010). Optimal strategic voting under majority runoff requires more complex strategies than the bare desertion of non--viable candidates.…”

Section: Electoral Systems and The Number Of Competing Candidatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Duverger (1951) argues that the difference is due to voting behaviour, as, he says, there are more strategic voters in plurality than in majority runoff elections. However, recent studies show that voters engage in strategic voting to almost the same extent under both electoral systems (Abramson et al 2010;Blais et al 2011; Van der Straeten et al 2010). Thus, the difference should be due to another factor.…”

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Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry Under Plurality and Majority Runoff

et al. 2016

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We know that electoral systems have an effect on the number of competing candidates.However, a mystery remains concerning the impact of majority runoff. According to theory, the number of competing candidates should be equal (or only marginally larger) under majority runoff than under plurality. However, in real--life elections, this number is much higher under majority runoff. To provide new insights on this puzzle, we report the results of a laboratory experiment where subjects play the role of candidates in plurality and majority runoff elections. We use a candidate--only and sincere--voting model to isolate the effect of the electoral system on the decision of candidates to enter the election. We find very little difference between the two electoral systems. We thus re--affirm the mystery of the number of competing candidates under majority runoff.

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“…Quelques expériences antérieures ont étudié la propension à voter stratégi-quement en employant une méthodologie en laboratoire (voir Forsythe et al, 1993 ;Rietz, 2008 ;Tyszler, 2008), mais la plupart d'entre elles ont utilisé la même règle de vote, soit celle de la pluralité. Il existe quelques études comparant le vote stratégique dans le système pluralitaire et le système à deux tours (van der Straeten et al, 2010 ; et d'autres qui comparent le système pluralitaire et le système proportionnel (Labbé St-Vincent, 2013). Dans ce dernier cas, aucune différence claire n'est observée, mais il faut avouer que le système était relativement peu proportionnel, avec seulement deux sièges par circonscription.…”

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Le vote à l’Élection d’à côté

St-Vincent

Blais

2016

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Nous avons mené une expérience électorale hors laboratoire. Un total de 1065 citoyens du Québec ont voté en ligne lors de six élections, six jours consécutifs, sous deux différents systèmes électoraux au cours de la campagne électorale provinciale au Québec en mars et avril 2014. Les électeurs devaient choisir entre les six principaux partis provinciaux. Afin qu’ils considèrent avec sérieux les résultats de nos élections, nous offrions un incitatif « hybride » basé partiellement sur leur appréciation « naturelle » de chaque parti et partiellement sur le succès de leurs partis préférés à l’élection. Également, plus ils participaient à une grande proportion des élections, plus ils étaient récompensés. Cet incitatif consistait en des points, chaque point donnant une chance de gagner un des six prix de 1000 $. L’objectif principal de l’étude était de comparer le vote entre deux systèmes électoraux, le système pluralitaire et le système proportionnel. La règle proportionnelle est basée sur le quota de Hare qui est appliqué à trois circonscriptions de quatre sièges. Sous le système pluralitaire, il y a douze circonscriptions avec un siège chacune. Nous trouvons davantage de désertions stratégiques sous le système pluralitaire, mais la différence est petite. De façon plus surprenante, nous observons un effet d’entraînement (ralliement au parti le plus fort) de même importance que la tendance à la désertion stratégique. En conclusion, nous discutons des avantages et des limites des expériences hors laboratoire.We conducted a voting experiment out of the lab. A total of 1065 Quebec citizens voted online in six consecutive elections with two different electoral systems during the recent 2014 provincial electoral campaign. The participants received a hybrid payoff based in part on their natural preferences and in part on the success of their preferred parties in the elections. Also, the more often they voted, the more they gained. The payoff was in terms of points that gave them a chance to win one of the six CAN$1000 prizes. The main purpose of the study was to compare voting behaviours between two systems: plurality and proportional representation elections. We do find more strategic desertion under the plurality rule, although the difference is small. More surprisingly we observe about as much bandwagon as strategic voting. To conclude, we discuss the merits and limits of out-of-the-lab experiments

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Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study

Cited by 73 publications

References 30 publications

Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election

Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election

Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry Under Plurality and Majority Runoff

Le vote à l’Élection d’à côté

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