Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies

Abstract

Cohesive government-vs-opposition voting is a robust empirical regularity in Westminster democracies. Using new data from the modern Scottish parliament we show that this pattern cannot be explained by similarity of preferences within or between the government and opposition ranks. We look at differences in the way that parties operate in Westminster and Holyrood and use roll call records show that the observed behavior is unlikely to be determined by preferences on any underlying issue dimension. Using a simple variant of the agenda-setting model-in which MPs can commit to their voting strategies-we show that the procedural rules for reaching collective decisions in Westminster systems can explain this phenomenon: in the equilibrium, on some bills, members of the opposition vote against the government irrespective of the proposal that is made. Such strategic opposition can reinforce government cohesiveness and have a moderating effect on policy outcomes. We introduce

Ideology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in the British Parliament

“…Beyond the UK, theoretical work suggests that governments can control the agenda to avoid legislative defeat (if not disunity) (Cox and McCubbins 2005;Tsebelis 2002). 3 Theoretical scholars have paid less attention to conditions that might foster high levels of unity among the opposition, although Dewan and Spirling (2011) offer a model in which opposition parties can achieve more favorable policy outcomes by committing their MPs to vote en bloc. If the opposition can remain unified, the government must compromise 3 There is an important distinction between the ability of government to use agenda control to pass policy and to reign in rebels.…”

Government-Opposition or Left-Right? The Institutional Determinants of Voting in Legislatures

“…14 Huber 1996Diermeier and Feddersen 1998. 15 Dewan and Spirling 2011. opposition members such that on some policies members of the opposition find themselves closer to the government than the opposition leadership. With sincere voting, some members of the opposition are hence likely to prefer a proposal of the government (the agenda-setter) to the status quo.…”

“…Huber 1996;Diermeier and Feddersen 1998;Dewan and Spirling 2011. There is, of course, much still to be done. Our cases are a small sample of all democracies and all possible variations in the institutional design of government.…”

“…Rather than directly test a particular theoretical model or set of theoretical propositions, our primary aim is to identify some empirical regularities which raise some questions about existing and future theoretical 1 McCubbins 2005, Dewan andSpirling 2011. work on legislative behaviour. For example, what are the main dimensions of political conflict in modern democratic legislatures?…”

The Origins of Parliamentary Agenda Control: A Comparative Process Tracing Analysis

“…Every bill proposal needs to be placed on the plenary agenda; its sponsors then have to make sure the proposal is not 'wrecked' by any unwanted amendments or terminated altogether in the legislative process (Döring 1995). Additionally, agenda-setting rules contain the danger of cyclical majorities (Shepsle 1979) and foster the cohesion of parties (Dewan and Spirling 2011) and governments (Heller 2001;Huber 1996a). Finally, control of the agenda has an effect on policies: governments controlling the agenda are more likely to introduce (and pass) more complex and more conflictive legislation, even though the general legislative output is lower (Döring 2004: 158-65).…”