Strategic Location Choice Under Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition and Spillovers

Colombo, Luca; Dawid, Herbert

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2346815

“…Alternatively, firms may finance innovative investment through equity financing, which has several advantages over debt for financing R&D (see Hall, 2002). 1 . As for public external financing tools, it is possible to distinguish public loans/guarantees, publicly owned equity, and subsidies in the form of prized, tax credits and other benefits related to green investments, grants and contracts (Olmos et al, 2012).…”

Section: Eco-innovation and Financial Constraints: A Review Of The LImentioning

confidence: 99%

Financial constraints and public funding of eco-innovation: empirical evidence from European SMEs

Cecere

¹

,

Corrocher

²

,

Mancusi

³

2018

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractFinancial constraints have an important impact on the development of eco-innovations, but their effect varies according to the type of funds taken into account. This article studies the impact of the lack of funds on the development of eco-innovations, distinguishing between internal, external and public funds. In particular, we investigate the interaction between public funding, on the one hand, and internal and other external sources of funding. The empirical analysis is based upon a sample of European SMEs belonging to different sectors that are involved in products, processes and organizational eco-innovations. Our resultsshow that a lack of internal funding always decreases the probability to introduce ecoinnovations, while the lack of private external funds does not appear to hinder the development of eco-innovations. Interestingly, we find that access to public funds or incentives is effective in improving a firm's ability to introduce eco-innovations, but only when the firm is not short of funds (either from internal or external sources), thus suggesting that public funds are somewhat complementary to other funds. Further analysis shows that these effects are mostly relevant in small firms.

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“…We consider a market with n firms, where each firm i offers a differentiated product at a price p i with common constant marginal costs c. The demand for good i is linear and given by 1) where p is the average market price, α > 0 and β > θ/n > 0. 1 We simplify standard models of monopolistic competition by specifying a linear demand function.…”

Section: Monopolistically Competitive Marketmentioning

confidence: 99%

PQ strategies in monopolistic competition: Some insights from the lab

Assenza

¹

,

Grazzini

²

,

Hommes

³

et al. 2015

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe present results from 50-rounds experimental markets in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a perishable good. The experiment is designed to study the price-quantity setting behavior of subjects acting as firms in monopolistic competition. In the implemented treatments subjects are asked to make both production and pricing decisions given different information sets. We investigate how subjects decide on prices and quantities in response to signals from the firms' internal conditions, i.e., individual profits, excess demand, and excess supply, and the market environment, i.e., aggregate price level. We find persistent heterogeneity in individual behavior, with about 46% of market followers, 28% profit-adjusters and 26% demand adjusters. Nevertheless, prices and quantities tend to converge to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium and that subjects' behavior is well described by learning heuristics.JEL codes: TBD

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“…The reform has the main objective to overcome the Italian "perfect" bicameral system, by transforming the upper house in a Senate of local representatives 1 . But it has also the purpose to change radically number and responsibilities of sub-central governments, weakening the constitutional role of regions and definitely eliminating one level of sub-regional government (provinces).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic crisis and fiscal federalism in Italy

Ambrosanio¹,

Balduzzi²,

Bordignon³

2016

Multi-Level Finance and the Euro Crisis

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractFor almost two decades, starting from the early '90s, Italy experienced the strongest wave of decentralization reforms in its post II World War history. The causes were both economic and political. Yet, in recent years, again economic and political causes seem to call for opposite reforms. Along with a second wave of scandals, this time interesting local politicians, the crisis that has hit our country since 2008 is having relevant effects on the relationships between central and local governments. The aim of this paper is to assess dimension and direction of these effects. We first review the situation of "fiscal federalism" in Italy before the crisis, summarizing the decentralization process in the '90s, its consequences in terms of financing and functions for local governments, the constitutional reform of 2001 and the implementation problems this created. We then look at the numbers of the crisis; the "double dip" of the economic cycle in the period 2007-2013, the policies implemented to contrast the financial market confidence crisis and the distribution of the burden of the fiscal consolidation across levels of government. We also discuss the institutional features of the implemented policies, in particular referring to number of local governments and to the financial relationships between level of governments, including taxes, transfers, fiscal rules and bankruptcy procedurals. Finally, we look at the future: what consequences will the new European rules, as enshrined in the new art. 81, have on the financial relationships between levels of government? And how is the balance of power between the center and the periphery going to change in lieu of the new proposed Constitutional reform?JEL classification: H50, H60, H70

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Strategic Location Choice Under Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition and Spillovers

Cited by 22 publications

References 41 publications

Financial constraints and public funding of eco-innovation: empirical evidence from European SMEs

Financial constraints and public funding of eco-innovation: empirical evidence from European SMEs

PQ strategies in monopolistic competition: Some insights from the lab

Economic crisis and fiscal federalism in Italy

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