Strategic introduction of the marketplace channel under dual upstream disadvantages in sales efficiency and demand information

Yan, Yingchen; Zhao, Ruiqing; Xing, Tiantian

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2018.09.022

Cited by 133 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…This paper assumes that the revenue sharing proportion is

ϕ_{1} false(0 < ϕ_{1} < 1 false)

, namely, the sales revenue of products sold is allocated to e‐tailer 1 and the manufacturer according to the proportion ϕ 1 over

1 - ϕ_{1}

. This assumption is commonly adopted in the literature on online platform (e.g., Mantin et al., 2014; Geng et al., 2018; Yan et al., 2019), and we establish AR model in this scenario. Next, we study scenario III in which the dominant e‐tailer (e‐tailer 1) buys products from the common manufacturer at unit wholesale price w and then sells them to consumers at unit retail price p 1 on her online platform.…”

Section: Models and Analytical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

How to choose online sales formats for competitive e‐tailers

Wei

Wang

2020

Int Trans Operational Res

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Currently, many e‐tailers can sell manufacturers' products on their online platforms through reselling or agency selling formats. However, how to choose the optimal online sales formats has puzzled competitive e‐tailers with different channel roles. This paper uses stylized theoretical models to study this problem by considering the combined effects of e‐tailers' channel roles, each e‐tailer's referral fees, and the difference in e‐tailers' market shares. Our results show that if two e‐tailers sell the common manufacturer's products on their online platforms, no matter what sales format one e‐tailer adopts, the other e‐tailer's best choice depends on the two e‐tailers' referral fees and the difference in the two e‐tailers' market shares, whereas the manufacturer's best action is always to let the other e‐tailer adopt agency selling format regardless of the two e‐tailers' referral fees and channel roles and the difference in the two e‐tailers' market shares. Moreover, if two e‐tailers sell the common manufacturer's products on their online platforms, it is most profitable for the manufacturer when both e‐tailers adopt agency selling format and charge equal referral fees to the manufacturer, and the same is true for the whole supply chain, which is independent of the two e‐tailers' channel roles and the difference in the two e‐tailers' market shares.

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“…This paper assumes that the revenue sharing proportion is

ϕ_{1} false(0 < ϕ_{1} < 1 false)

, namely, the sales revenue of products sold is allocated to e‐tailer 1 and the manufacturer according to the proportion ϕ 1 over

1 - ϕ_{1}

Section: Models and Analytical Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, Yan et al. (2019) and Mantin et al. (2014) explore the decision on whether to introduce AS format in addition to the existing R format.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

How to choose online sales formats for competitive e‐tailers

Wei

Wang

2020

Int Trans Operational Res

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show abstract

“…When more than one equilibrium result exists, it is necessary to refine the equilibrium results. Due to intuitive criterion, a classical equilibrium refinement tool proposed by Cho and Kreps [38], it is easy to verify that the pooling equilibrium cannot survive the intuitive criterion [27,39,40]. Thus, the rest of this paper mainly focuses on the separating equilibrium.…”

Section: Methodology Under F Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Acquisition and Its Incentives in an E-Commerce Supply Chain under the Offline Showroom Model

Zhang

2021

JTAER

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Recently, the showroom model has developed fast for allowing consumers to evaluate a product offline and then buy it online. This paper aims at exploring the optimal information acquisition strategy and its incentive contracts in an e-commerce supply chain with two competing e-tailers and an offline showroom. Based on signaling game theory, we build a mathematical model by considering the impact of experience service and competition intensity on consumers’ demand. We find that, on the one hand, information acquisition promotes supply chain members to obtain demand information directly or indirectly, which leads to forecast revenue. On the other hand, information acquisition promotes supply chain members to distort optimal decisions, which results in signal cost. The optimal information acquisition strategy depends on the joint impact of forecast revenue, signal cost and demand forecast cost. Notably, in some conditions, the offline showroom will not acquire demand information even when its cost is equal to zero. We also design two different information acquisition incentive contracts to obtain Pareto improvement for all supply chain members.

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“…To incorporate the spillover effect, similar to Abhishek et al [7] and Yan et al [8], we assume that there already exists a brick-and-mortar retail channel (i.e., traditional channel) where the manufacturer sells the product at a unit price normalized to 1 with a base demand Q, which represents the general demand of the traditional channel when the manufacturer does not sell online. e sales of traditional channel are influenced by the sales through the e-channels.…”

Section: Online Spillover Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…ey also found that if there is negative spillover effect, e-tailers prefer the agency selling channel; otherwise, they prefer the reselling channel. By measuring the combined impacts of the online spillover effect, the platform fee, and the manufacturer's inefficiency in selling, Yan et al [8] focused on whether and under what conditions the marketplace channel should be introduced. However, all the above researches are based on the assumption that the decision makers know full information about the market and can make pricing decisions accurately.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complexity Analysis of Pricing in a Multichannel Supply Chain with Spillovers from Online to Offline Sales

et al. 2020

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In recent years, many manufacturers have been selling their products to online consumers through e-tailers by adopting reselling mode and agency selling mode simultaneously. The sales from the online channels inevitably incur spillover effect to the traditional offline channels. This paper develops a dynamic pricing game model on the basis of a long-term gradient adjustment mechanism for a multichannel supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and an e-tailer and focuses on examining the impacts of spillover effect, agency fee, and adjustment speed on the stability and complexity of the dynamic game system. The results show that both a greater spillover effect and a higher agency fee can make the dynamic game system more stable, and a higher adjustment speed can destabilize the dynamic game system through period doubling bifurcation. Furthermore, it is interesting to find that the destabilization of the game system benefits the e-tailer and the supply chain while having little influence on the manufacturer, and thus the dynamic adjustment strategy may improve the supply chain efficiency.

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Strategic introduction of the marketplace channel under dual upstream disadvantages in sales efficiency and demand information

Cited by 133 publications

References 35 publications

How to choose online sales formats for competitive e‐tailers

How to choose online sales formats for competitive e‐tailers

Information Acquisition and Its Incentives in an E-Commerce Supply Chain under the Offline Showroom Model

Complexity Analysis of Pricing in a Multichannel Supply Chain with Spillovers from Online to Offline Sales

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