Strategic Integration Decision under Supply Chain Competition in the Presence of Online Channel

Saha, Subrata; Nielsen, Izabela

doi:10.3390/sym13010058

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…To further verify the conclusions obtained in the previous sections and analyze how the key parameters affect the equilibrium outcomes (such as value-added service levels, ad prices and profits) under different scenarios, this section conducts numerical simulations by using MATLAB [40,41]. Section 6.1 analyzes the impacts of key parameters-marginal investment costs, positive consumer effects and negative advertising effects-on the equilibrium outcomes of the investment platform under scenario A.…”

Section: Numerical Simulationmentioning

confidence: 89%

Two-Sided Beneficial Value-Added Service Investment and Pricing Strategies in Asymmetric/Symmetric Investment Scenarios

Liu

2023

Symmetry

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We explore media platforms’ investment strategies for two-sided beneficial value-added services, which can directly benefit both consumers and advertisers, and ad pricing strategies by using game theory. We consider an asymmetric investment scenario, scenario A, and a symmetric investment scenario, scenario S, and develop game models under each scenario. First, we obtain the equilibrium investments, prices and profits and analyze the influence of the three important parameters—marginal investment costs, positive consumer effects and negative advertising effects, on the equilibrium outcomes in each scenario. Then we compare these equilibrium outcomes between both scenarios. Finally, we conduct numerical simulations to verify the conclusions obtained in both scenarios. We show that in scenario A, the value-added service levels and ad prices of the investment platforms remain constant and then decrease with marginal investment costs. The ad prices and profits of the investment platforms increase (decrease) with positive consumer effects (negative advertising effects). The same change is true for the value-added service levels only under certain conditions. In scenario S, the value-added service levels of the investment platforms change with positive consumer effects or negative advertising effects only when marginal investment costs are high. The ad prices of the platforms always increase with positive consumer effects but increase with negative advertising effects only when marginal costs are low. The profits of the platforms vary monotonically with negative advertising effects, but not necessarily with positive consumer effects. Compared to scenario S, the ad prices of the investment platforms in scenario A are higher, but that is not always true for the value-added service levels.

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Section: Numerical Simulationmentioning

confidence: 89%

Two-Sided Beneficial Value-Added Service Investment and Pricing Strategies in Asymmetric/Symmetric Investment Scenarios

Liu

2023

Symmetry

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“…Zhao et al [14] used Stackelberg game to study the optimal pricing strategies of EV batteries in the context of government subsidies, in three different recycling channels in China in decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making models. Wang et al [15] aiming at the charging scenario of the Internet of vehicles and balancing the load variance and user cost, the pricing strategy and profit distribution of the EV aggregator participating in the demand response are studied by using the Shapley value-based demand response profit distribution strategy. Yang et al [16] based on the two-stage Stackelberg game, a subsidy pricing model of EV sharing operation mode with government participation is constructed.…”

Section: Pricing Strategy For Electric Vehiclesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Vertical Cooperation and Pricing Strategy of Electric Vehicle Supply Chain

2024

WEVJ

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To determine a vertical cooperation strategy and address the optimal pricing problem of the electric vehicle (EV) supply chain, a supply chain system consisting of two competing EV manufacturers (M1 and M2) and a battery supplier is studied. Firstly, three cooperation strategy models were constructed for the battery supplier and the EV manufacturers, namely: Strategy N (neither the battery supplier nor the two manufacturers cooperate with each other); Strategy I (M1 cooperates with the battery supplier); and Strategy II (M2 cooperates with the battery supplier). Then, the Stackelberg solution method was used to obtain the optimal equilibrium decisions under the three strategic models. Finally, the effect of the preference coefficient of consumers for leasing EVs per unit on the optimal equilibrium decision was analyzed. We found that: (1) The wholesale price of batteries provided by the battery supplier to M1 is always greater than to M2. (2) Strategies I and II prompt M1 and M2 to reduce the unit and fixed rental prices of EVs to some extent, while intensifying the competition between the two manufacturers in terms of EV lease prices. (3) When the consumer preference coefficient (θ) for leasing EVs per unit provided by manufacturer M1 is relatively small, the cooperation alliance S2 and the supply chain achieve the maximum profit under Strategy II; however, while θ is large, M1, cooperative alliance S1, and the entire supply chain could benefit the most under Strategy I.

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“…Song et al [9] studied the optimal pricing of green fresh product supply chain from the perspective of green degree and freshness sensitivity under the background of the game. Saha and Nielsen [10] explored how strategies affect manufacturers' and retailers' product pricing decisions and supply chain performance. In terms of inventory, Cheng et al [11] considered a supply chain consisting of suppliers and e-retailers on the Internet to study inventory issues in the supply chain.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategy Analysis of Selling Model Selection in Vertical Competition Supply Chains: A Game Theoretic Model

Chen

Liu

Wang

et al. 2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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This paper takes the supply chain perspective to study the choice of selling model for manufacturers and e-tailers. To accomplish our objective, we consider three selling models, including reselling, agency selling, and mixed selling. By comparing and analyzing the equilibrium outcomes of the three selling models, we obtain some beneficial results. These results show that manufacturers and e-tailers cannot manage to make a profit at the same time whether they choose the reselling model or agency selling model. Our results also show that the mixed selling model may improve supply chain performance, as long as the cross-price elasticity is not low. Especially when the cross-price elasticity is comparatively high, a manufacturer and an e-tailer in vertical competition can achieve a profit-Pareto-improving situation, regardless of the market share of the e-tailer.

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Strategic Integration Decision under Supply Chain Competition in the Presence of Online Channel

Cited by 9 publications

References 41 publications

Two-Sided Beneficial Value-Added Service Investment and Pricing Strategies in Asymmetric/Symmetric Investment Scenarios

Two-Sided Beneficial Value-Added Service Investment and Pricing Strategies in Asymmetric/Symmetric Investment Scenarios

Research on Vertical Cooperation and Pricing Strategy of Electric Vehicle Supply Chain

Strategy Analysis of Selling Model Selection in Vertical Competition Supply Chains: A Game Theoretic Model

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