Strategic Information Revelation

Okuno‐Fujiwara, Masahiro; Postlewaite, Andrew; Suzumura, Kotaro

doi:10.2307/2297541

Cited by 284 publications

(139 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Finally, property (4) is similar to properties (a) and (b), (pages [16][17], in the discussion of the example in section 3.…”

Section: If a Player I Deviates At The Final Stage Of The Communicatimentioning

confidence: 72%

Cheap talk in games with incomplete information

Ben-Porath

2003

Journal of Economic Theory

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The paper studies Bayesian games which are extended by adding pre-play communication.Let Γ be a Bayesian game with full support and with three or more players. The main result is that if players can send private messages to each other and make public announcements then every communication equilibrium outcome, q, that is rational (i.e., involves probabilities that are rational numbers) can be implemented in a sequential equilibrium of a cheap talk extension of Γ, provided that the following condition is satisfied: There exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium s in Γ such that for each type t i of each player i the expected payoff of t i in q is larger than the expected payoff of t i in s.Journal of Economic Literature classification number: C7.

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“…Finally, property (4) is similar to properties (a) and (b), (pages [16][17], in the discussion of the example in section 3.…”

Section: If a Player I Deviates At The Final Stage Of The Communicatimentioning

confidence: 72%

Cheap talk in games with incomplete information

Ben-Porath

2003

Journal of Economic Theory

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“…In this section, we show that all our results carry over for the case where the solution concept is mixed strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. 30 First, it is easy to see 30 The fact that the mixed equilibria include the pure equilibria can make implementation with mixed strategies easier or more difficult. More specifically, let f be a SCF and Γ a mechanism.…”

Section: F Mixed Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implementation with partial provability

Ben-Porath

Lipman

2012

Journal of Economic Theory

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We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the profile of preferences of the agents and by allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence. We show that a simple condition on the evidence structure which is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state independent is also sufficient for implementation for any preferences (including state dependent) if the social planner can perform small monetary transfers beyond those called for by f and there are at least three players. If transfers can be large, f can be implemented in a game with perfect information when there are at least two players under an additional boundedness assumption. In both cases, transfers only occur off the equilibrium path. In the special but important case of allocation problems, under weak conditions, f can be implemented in a perfect information game with at least two players and no transfers. In all cases, the use of evidence enables implementation which is robust in the sense that the social planner needs very little information about the preferences, beliefs, and evidence of the agents and the agents need little information about each others' preferences. Furthermore, our results still hold if evidence can be forged at an arbitrarily small but strictly positive cost. Finally, we relate our results to the classical work of Maskin (1977) and Moore and Repullo (1988) on implementation without evidence.

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“…Without these, or equivalently if f(A) / 0 and t(A) / 0, our model would give way to the well-known "disclosure principle" of persuasion games (Grossman [11], Milgrom [17], Milgrom and Roberts [18], Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura [19]): if the stakeholder needs to be convinced, precision is costless, and the potential polluter cannot lie, then there is an equilibrium where the latter provides fully accurate information and reveals the true nature of his activity. This equilibrium would be supported by the usual "sophisticated-skepticism" argument that, in such a context, the stakeholder completely discounts any partial reporting because she believes that the firm dealing with a safe activity has no reason to conceal this.…”

Section: Relationships With the Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

A theory of environmental risk disclosure

Sinclair‐Desgagné¹,

Gozlan²

2003

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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CIRANOLe CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Résumé / AbstractLa réglementation des risques environnementaux met de plus en plus l'accent sur l'information et la responsabilisation des parties prenantes. Le succès de cette approche repose toutefois largement sur la qualité de l'information fournie par les entreprises visées. Cet article porte sur la quantité et la qualité de l'information qui serait volontairement fournie à une partie prenante par un pollueur potentiel. On trouve que cette information sera moins précise lorsque la partie prenante est confiante (voire naïve) a priori, que le coût d'analyse de l'information livrée croît avec la complexité de celle-ci, ou que le revenu attendu par une entreprise se révélant être en non conformité est petit. En revanche, une partie prenante inquiète et un faible coût de production de données précises encouragent la livraison d'une information de meilleure qualité. La précision de l'information livrée permet à une firme sûre de se distinguer d'autant plus facilement d'une firme dangereuse que son revenu ex post est relativement plus élevé. À la lumière de notre modèle, on examine en terminant plusieurs principes se rapportant au design des programmes publics de révélation des risques à la santé et à l'environnement.

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Strategic Information Revelation

Cited by 284 publications

References 14 publications

Cheap talk in games with incomplete information

Cheap talk in games with incomplete information

Implementation with partial provability

A theory of environmental risk disclosure

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