2022
DOI: 10.1109/tits.2021.3077467
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Strategic Hub-Based Platoon Coordination Under Uncertain Travel Times

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Cited by 26 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Larson et al [26] developed a distributed control system in which trucks can adjust speed to form platoons to save fuels. Johansson et al [27] developed two game-theoretic models to study the platoon coordination problem where vehicles can wait at network nodes to form platoons. In Table 1, we compare the newly developed functional components and the performance analysis of the AMoD system with the new components in our modeling framework with the referred studies in the literature.…”
Section: E Strategic Platoon Formation On Highwaysmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Larson et al [26] developed a distributed control system in which trucks can adjust speed to form platoons to save fuels. Johansson et al [27] developed two game-theoretic models to study the platoon coordination problem where vehicles can wait at network nodes to form platoons. In Table 1, we compare the newly developed functional components and the performance analysis of the AMoD system with the new components in our modeling framework with the referred studies in the literature.…”
Section: E Strategic Platoon Formation On Highwaysmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Platoon coordination when each truck optimizes its own profit was considered in [21] and in our previous research efforts [22]- [25]. The motivation lies in the fact that trucks can be owned by small transport companies or even single persons, making centralized coordination hard to implement.…”
Section: A Related Work On Platoon Coordinationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The motivation lies in the fact that trucks can be owned by small transport companies or even single persons, making centralized coordination hard to implement. The works in [21], [22], [24], [25] use non-cooperative games to model and study strategic interactions among trucks when they form platoons to maximize their individual profits. The work in [23] uses a cooperative game to design a profit redistribution mechanism to incentivize trucks on the same road segment to form and maintain the optimal platoon formation.…”
Section: A Related Work On Platoon Coordinationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This approach indeed decreases the computation load in comparison with centralized schemes, while as the platooning opportunities of individual trucks are only considered at one intersection, the platooning benefit at the following intersections may get lost. Another closely related work is [23], in which a similar waiting time scheduling problem is studied for trucks with individual utility functions. In difference to our work, the authors in [23] formulate the problem in a non-cooperative game theoretic framework and present Nash equilibrium as solution concept, which requires a large number of iterations to find an equilibrium solution for many trucks.…”
Section: A Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another closely related work is [23], in which a similar waiting time scheduling problem is studied for trucks with individual utility functions. In difference to our work, the authors in [23] formulate the problem in a non-cooperative game theoretic framework and present Nash equilibrium as solution concept, which requires a large number of iterations to find an equilibrium solution for many trucks. In this paper, we propose a solution that allows each truck to compute its waiting times independently from others, making it more efficient to compute than an equilibrium solution and more suitable for handling massive transport networks.…”
Section: A Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%