2016
DOI: 10.1037/apl0000072
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Strategic consequences of emotional misrepresentation in negotiation: The blowback effect.

Abstract: Recent research indicates that expressing anger elicits concession making from negotiating counterparts. When emotions are conveyed either by a computer program or by a confederate, results appear to affirm a long-standing notion that feigning anger is an effective bargaining tactic. We hypothesize this tactic actually jeopardizes postnegotiation deal implementation and subsequent exchange. Four studies directly test both tactical and strategic consequences of emotional misrepresentation. False representations… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

1
35
0

Year Published

2017
2017
2021
2021

Publication Types

Select...
8

Relationship

2
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 53 publications
(36 citation statements)
references
References 65 publications
1
35
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Once negotiators perceive that their actions have damaged a relationship, social exchange theory predicts they will feel obligated to make amends in later exchanges (Emerson, 1976;Gouldner, 1960;McCullough, Kurzban, & Tabak, 2013). Negotiators may not only feel compelled to avoid actions that might harm their counterpart (Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995) but may also try to remedy the situation (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010) by investing additional resources into the relationship (Campagna et al, 2016). Such a potential additional costly investment calls into question the value of using anger tactics in the first place.…”
Section: Post-negotiation Cooperation During Implementationmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Once negotiators perceive that their actions have damaged a relationship, social exchange theory predicts they will feel obligated to make amends in later exchanges (Emerson, 1976;Gouldner, 1960;McCullough, Kurzban, & Tabak, 2013). Negotiators may not only feel compelled to avoid actions that might harm their counterpart (Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995) but may also try to remedy the situation (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010) by investing additional resources into the relationship (Campagna et al, 2016). Such a potential additional costly investment calls into question the value of using anger tactics in the first place.…”
Section: Post-negotiation Cooperation During Implementationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet none of this work has considered whether negotiators intentionally feigning anger to pressure their counterparts to comply with their demands might themselves be affected by this tactic. Instead, research has almost exclusively focused on testing the effects of angry messages on recipients' reactions (Van Kleef et al, 2004a;Van Dijk et al, 2008;Wang et al, 2012; for an exception, see Campagna, Mislin, Kong, & Bottom, 2016). Although some negotiators may be unaffected by the potential ethical (Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000) and legal (Shell, 1991) implications of anger tactics, we expect that most will experience some emotional discomfort due to the difference between how they believe they ought to behave and how they actually behaved (Higgins, 1989) during a negotiation.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…People who feel mistreated by a counterpart may subsequently seek to restore equity or balance through acts such as sabotage, retaliation, or conflict escalation (see, e.g., Kim & Smith, 1993;Walster, Walster, & Berschied, 1978;Wang, Northcraft, & Van Kleef, 2012). A bargainer's hostility may appear to beget better terms for them initially but may damage their counterpart's trust for them and ultimately undermine the implementation of an agreement (Campagna, Mislin, Kong, & Bottom, 2016).…”
Section: The Downside Of High Assertivenessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, studies show that individual behavior changes in continuous interactions, as people predominantly base their future behavior on the past behavior of their partners (e.g., Ames & Johar, ; Pillutla, Malhotra, & Murnighan, ). Thus, emotional displays may have different effects on trust and subsequent behavior when individuals have multiple encounters with one another and engage in a series of negotiation exchanges, or have long‐term relationship with each other as compared to what we have observed in this research on initial responses (e.g., Campagna, Mislin, Kong, & Bottom, ). Finally, investigating how the effects of emotional expressions on initial stereotypes and trust impressions at zero‐acquaintance are moderated by various personality traits, such as trait affect (Schwartz et al., ; Wilkowski & Robinson, ), general propensity to trust (Colquitt et al., ), prosocial orientation (Grant, ), as well as individual's incidental affect (Chen, Belkin, McNamee, & Kurtzberg, ; Dunn & Schweitzer, ), may offer additional insights on individual judgments and decision‐making ability in a variety of contexts.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 51%