Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment

Informational Aspects of Conflict

“…If one player commits in the first period and the other in the second period, then play is as in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential-move game. Baik and Shogren (1992) show that in equilibrium the underdog commits in the first period and the favorite in the second, leading to lower aggregate equilibrium effort than under simultaneous moves.…”

“…Nevertheless, anticipating a rational response on the part of the firm that goes second, the first firm can improve its profit relative to equilibrium of a simultaneous-move model, and that of the second firm decreases. In the same spirit, sequential decisionmaking and commitment in contests is studied by, e.g., Dixit (1987), Baik and Shogren (1992), and Morgan (2003).…”

Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods

“…The payments may therefore drive the selection between a peaceful equilibrium and violent fights inside the clan. Stages G2-G4 describe the allocation of the prize in an all-pay auction with endogenous timing, building on Baik and Shogren (1992), Baik (1994Baik ( , 2005 and Leininger (1993). The cornerstone of this allocation rule is a contest success function that maps clan members' effort choices into win probabilities.…”

Endogenous Timing in Contests with Group-Specific Public-Goods Prizes

“…Drawing on contest theory, all players obtain a strategic advantage when they choose the timing of moves endogenously. Players who move earlier employ a strategic advantage, whereas players who move later efficiently manage their strategies by observing the preceding move of the players [9] [10] [11] [12]. For this reason, one may intuitively explain that both players exerting a positive effort and free riders can benefit by the choice of endogenous timing.…”