Strategic Analysis of Terrorism

Arce, Daniel G.; Sandler, Todd

doi:10.1007/978-3-211-09442-6_20

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(42 reference statements)

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“…Because governments largely resort to defensive strategies, they may be unsuccessful in effectively curbing terrorism. 5 For example, Enders and Sandler found that while the global proliferation of airport metal detectors in the early 1970s led to a significant reduction in skyjackings, the subsequent rise in the number of other hostage attacks and assassinations offset the gains associated with the airport security measures. 6 Similarly, fortifying U.S. embassies prompted a substitution into assassinations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Situational Model of Displacement and Diffusion Following the Introduction of Airport Metal Detectors

Hsu

Apel

2014

Terrorism and Political Violence

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Much of the discourse surrounding counterterrorism centers on the inevitability of displacement, or the substitution of another form of terrorist attack in place of the one that has been thwarted. Yet a longstanding tradition of research in situational crime prevention finds that displacement is far from inevitable, and often depends crucially on the specific features of the incidents in question. In fact, crime prevention efforts are often followed by a ''diffusion of benefits'' (i.e., crime reductions) to incidents, groups, or locations that were not the intended target of the intervention. The current study examines various forms of displacement and diffusion in response to airport metal detectors among terrorist groups that had been involved in the perpetration of aviation attacks prior to their implementation. Using data from the Global Terrorism Database, the findings from interrupted time series models suggest a complex set of displacement and diffusion effects with respect to alternative attack modes, target types, and weapon usage.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Situational Model of Displacement and Diffusion Following the Introduction of Airport Metal Detectors

Hsu

Apel

2014

Terrorism and Political Violence

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“…The impact of leader-follower behavior on burden sharing and total output depends on the presence of strategic substitutes or complements. Possible combinations are even richer when mixed cases are considered-seeArce and Sandler (2009).…”

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confidence: 99%

Collective action: fifty years later

Sandler

2015

Public Choice

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This paper presents a retrospective view of Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action. The paper's primary purpose is to investigate the validity of Olson's propositions concerning group size, group composition, and institutional design. This purpose is accomplished by drawing on the literature and the paper's game-theoretic representations. Key considerations behind the validity of his propositions concern benefit rivalry, the aggregation technology, strategic assumptions, and participation costs. The difference between public good and commons games is also an essential consideration. Generally, Olson's propositions fare best for benefit rivalry, a summation aggregator, Nash behavior, and positive participation costs. Because his propositions are true in many important real-world situations, the book remains highly relevant. Efforts to find exceptions to Olson's propositions have served to further our understanding of collective action.

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“…The challenge is to issue threats that must be sufficiently unpleasant to deter terrorists, but not so repugnant as to not be carried out; these models thus carry a credibility constraint [273]. The effects of counter-terrorism policies have been studied in two strategic cases [274]: when government intervention is defensive, and a corollary to terrorist action, and when it is a proactive substitute for it. Negative responses may arise in both cases: erosion of terrorist support, if attacks cause too much damage; backlash against the government, if its response is too strong.…”

Section: Game Theoretic Models Of Terrorismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mathematical Models of Radicalization and Terrorism

Chuang,

D'Orsogna

2019

Preprint

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The rapid spread of radical ideologies has led to a world-wide succession of terrorist attacks in recent years. Understanding how extremist tendencies germinate, develop, and drive individuals to action is important from a cultural standpoint, but also to help formulate response and prevention strategies. Demographic studies, interviews with radicalized subjects, analysis of terrorist databases, reveal that the path to radicalization occurs along progressive steps, where age, social context and peer-to-peer exchanges play major roles. To execute terrorist attacks, radicals must efficiently communicate with one another while maintaining secrecy; they are also subject to pressure from counter-terrorism agencies, public opinion and the need for material resources. Similarly, government entities must gauge which intervention methods are most effective. While a complete understanding of the processes that lead to extremism and violence, and of which deterrents are optimal, is still lacking, mathematical modelers have contributed to the discourse by using tools from statistical mechanics and applied mathematics to describe existing and novel paradigms, and to propose novel counter-terrorism strategies. We review some of their approaches in this work, including compartment models for populations of increasingly extreme views, continuous time models for age-structured radical populations, radicalization as social contagion processes on lattices and social networks, agent based models, game theoretic formulations. We highlight the useful insights offered by analyzing radicalization and terrorism through quantitative frameworks. Finally, we discuss the role of institutional intervention and the stages at which deradicalization strategies might be most effective.

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Strategic Analysis of Terrorism

Cited by 6 publications

References 22 publications

A Situational Model of Displacement and Diffusion Following the Introduction of Airport Metal Detectors

A Situational Model of Displacement and Diffusion Following the Introduction of Airport Metal Detectors

Collective action: fifty years later

Mathematical Models of Radicalization and Terrorism

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