STPA systemic approach for OHS and operational risk analysis of data glove use in 4.0 assembly

A comprehensive STPA-PSO framework for quantifying smart glasses risks in manufacturing

“…The methodology employed in this research involves the application of STPA to identify and assess the associated risks. By using STPA, it becomes possible to identify potentially unsafe or inadequate control actions that could give rise to hazards at any stage of the system lifecycle [ 59 ]. The STPA analysis has four main steps [ 89 ].…”

“…The person who analyzes the system must explain the structure of the control system, and find out which variables are involved in the study [ 59 ]. Hierarchical control structures typically encompass five essential components: controllers, control actions, feedback, other inputs and outputs from components, and processes controlled by the controllers [ 60 ].…”

“…Based on the concept of system theory, STAMP was developed in 2004 by Nancy Leveson to deal with complex systems [ 47 , 59 ]. It addresses the limitations of traditional accident analysis by incorporating system complexity, multicausality, human factors, system resilience and adaptation, and a forward-looking approach to proactive accident prevention [ 60 ].…”

“…Analyzing the system can aid in identifying potential causes of accidents, thus enabling the elimination or control of hazards [ 65 ]. This qualitative method offers a comprehensive perspective of the system, and facilitates a detailed analysis of the interrelationships among system components in terms of safety control actions [ 59 ]. In order to avoid or control hazards during development, STPA analyzes the potential causes of accidents [ 60 ].…”

“…It is capable of considering various factors that can lead to loss events, including design errors, software flaws, interactions among components, complex human errors, as well as social, organizational, and management factors [ 64 ]. By employing STPA, it becomes feasible to detect control actions that could be unsafe or insufficient, potentially resulting in hazards at any point in the system's lifecycle [ 59 ]. Several studies have shown that this method is effective in complex operating environments with multiple controllers controlling the same process [ 66 ].…”