Storks, Cabbage Patches, and the Right to Procreate

Pearson, Yvette E.

doi:10.1007/s11673-007-9047-4

Cited by 9 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 13 publications

(7 reference statements)

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“…In short, while genetic reproduction or gestation is important when conjoined with the possibility of becoming a parent, an interest in doing either or both on their own is not 9 See O'Neill 1979. See also Quigley 2010, Steinbock 1995, Pearson 2007 significant enough to ground a right to reproduce.…”

Section: The Interest In Genetic or Biological Reproductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can a Right to Reproduce Justify the Status Quo on Parental Licensing?

Botterell¹,

McLeod²

2015

Permissible Progeny?

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Most Western jurisdictions require parental licensing in the case of adoption but not in the case of assisted or unassisted biological reproduction. In an earlier paper, we set out to show that no arguments in favour of such a system of parental licensing succeed. One argument that we failed to consider, however, is one that appeals to the notion of a right to reproduce. According to this argument, prospective biological parents are protected from parental licensing because they exercise a right to reproduce when attempting to have children, while the same cannot be said about prospective adoptive parents. This paper shows that such an argument is flawed. It also questions whether people have a right to reproduce, and distinguishes this right from other, legitimate, rights, such a right to become a parent and a right to bodily autonomy.

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Section: The Interest In Genetic or Biological Reproductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can a Right to Reproduce Justify the Status Quo on Parental Licensing?

Botterell¹,

McLeod²

2015

Permissible Progeny?

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“…Yvette Pearson (2007), for example argues that because reproduction is so fundamental to human existence the general assumption is that it does not need any argument in its defence. Reproductive rights are most relevant in the context of abortion, contraception, freedom from sterilisation, and freedom from coercion in pregnancy management, but also with regard to access to infertility treatment, freedom to engage in reproductive contracts or multipleparty interventions, and in relation to receiving funding for procreative assistance.…”

Section: Content and Scopementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yet it is argued in the literature that there is no satisfactory account of a right to procreate and that we should refrain from grounding practices or policies on the assumption that there is such a right. Yvette Pearson (2007), for example argues that because reproduction is so fundamental to human existence the general assumption is that it does not need any argument in its defence. Pearson holds that attempts to defend a right to procreate rely on arguments developed to defend an individual's choices to refrain from procreation (p. 107), and that such an alleged right ‘seems no more than a compelling fiction that provides comfort to those who are unable to provide a sound defense of the actions of those whose procreative activities are questioned or restricted’ (p. 108).…”

Section: Conceptual Difficultiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Male and Female He Created Them’: Procreative liberty, its conceptual deficiencies and the legal right to access fertility care of males

Sperling

2011

International Journal of Law in Context

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In recent years, assisted reproductive technologies have played an important role in shaping the lives of many individuals throughout the world. Their promise to make people become parents is believed to fulfil the most elementary interests a person may have. It is argued and legally acknowledged that such interests constitute with much significance a person's self-identity and sense of belonging to the living society, also constituting her reproductive liberty or the right to procreate. Despite their significance and importance, access to these technologies and to fertility care specifically may not always accord with the principle of equality and justice. It will be argued that, in some cases, such unequal access reflects various forms of discrimination between different groups in society. It is the purpose of this article to show that such a phenomenon is the result of an underdeveloped and unregulated area of law, characterising many Western countries. Specifically, it demonstrates conceptual deficiencies in so-called ‘procreative liberty’ with regard to the content and scope of the right to procreate, the values underlying such a right, and the legal and social institutions supporting and securing it. The article highlights these deficiencies, making them more evident when the notion of ‘reproductive liberty’ applies to positive and modern attempts to become parents, especially but not exclusively those brought by men.

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“…Insofar as we have such a drive, is it “rooted in biology” or in social conditioning [5]? Rosoff and Katsur’s answer seems to be “both” [2].…”

Section: Why Do the Research?mentioning

confidence: 99%