2016
DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12178
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Stock Recommendations for Politically Connected Firms

Abstract: Social network connections of corporations can significantly affect operating performance and firm valuation. Political connections are one form of social networking which often manifests into improved firm profitability as a result of political favors granted by politicians. However, analysts often have greater difficulty forecasting the earnings of politically connected firms than those of non‐connected firms. This is because politicians often grant political favors to firms in an unpredictable manner making… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

3
15
0

Year Published

2018
2018
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
8

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 13 publications
(18 citation statements)
references
References 65 publications
(129 reference statements)
3
15
0
Order By: Relevance
“…There is a negative and weakly significant relationship between politically-connected companies (POCN) and sell-side analysts' stock recommendations with a significance level of 10% (z 5 À1.71, p-value 5 0.087), which suggests that analysts issue less favorable stock recommendations for POCN. These results are consistent with the results of previous studies which find that analysts face greater difficulties when estimating earnings for politically connected firms (Chen et al, 2010) and their stock recommendations are less profitable for highly connected firms (Alfonso, 2016). With regards to the other control variables board size (BSIZE) and share return (RETURN), the results show no significant relationship between these variables and sell-side analysts' stock recommendations.…”
Section: Restatements and Analysts' Stock Recommendationssupporting
confidence: 90%
“…There is a negative and weakly significant relationship between politically-connected companies (POCN) and sell-side analysts' stock recommendations with a significance level of 10% (z 5 À1.71, p-value 5 0.087), which suggests that analysts issue less favorable stock recommendations for POCN. These results are consistent with the results of previous studies which find that analysts face greater difficulties when estimating earnings for politically connected firms (Chen et al, 2010) and their stock recommendations are less profitable for highly connected firms (Alfonso, 2016). With regards to the other control variables board size (BSIZE) and share return (RETURN), the results show no significant relationship between these variables and sell-side analysts' stock recommendations.…”
Section: Restatements and Analysts' Stock Recommendationssupporting
confidence: 90%
“…However, analyst recommendations can be "sticky" as analysts tend to reiterate their previous recommendations without any change in levels (Asquith et al, 2005;Francis and Soffer, 1997). To examine whether our results are robust to an alternative specification using stock recommendation changes, we rerun model (1) restricting our sample to stock recommendation revisions (Alfonso, 2016). 21 Specifically, we measure the profitability of upgrade and downgrade stock recommendations (CHANGE_PFT) as the market adjusted return to the recommendation over the period from the day before the recommendation revision date until the earlier of either 30 days or 2 days before the recommendation is revised.…”
Section: Changes In Stock Recommendationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians all emerge in the model. More recently, using US data, Alfonso () finds analysts have greater difficulty forecasting the earnings of politically connected firms than those of non‐connected firms because politicians often grant political favours to firms in an unpredictable manner.…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%