Stock market reaction to CEO certification: the signaling role of CEO background

Zhang, Yan; Wiersema, Margarethe F.

doi:10.1002/smj.772

Cited by 324 publications

(251 citation statements)

References 79 publications

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“…The mega corporate scandals across the globe like BCCI, Enron, WorldCom, Northern Rock, Lehman Brothers, Freddy Mac, Fanny Mae and many more have motivated global corporate reforms and regulations in developed world, which was followed and adopted by developing world (Vintila & Gherghina, 2013 (Kamran & Shah, 2014). These corporate reforms have brought numerous managerial challenges and technicalities to managers and policy holders, which would have long lasting effects on organizational performance and conduct of daily affairs as highlighted in studies by Shipilov et al (2010), Zhang and Wiersema (2009), and others.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

An empirical analysis of corporate governance and firm value: Evidence from KSE-100 Index

Khan¹,

Tanveer²,

Malik³

2017

10.5267/j.ac

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This paper investigates the impact of corporate governance on firm value measured by Tobin's Q. Different corporate governance proxies i.e. board size, board independence, audit committee and CEO duality are interacted with firm value. A sample of 91 nonfinancial firms listed on KSE was selected over the period 2010-2014. The findings of the study show that board size and CEO duality had negative impacts on firm value. Moreover, board size, non-executive directors and audit committee had positive and significant impacts on firm value.Growing Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 7

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Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

An empirical analysis of corporate governance and firm value: Evidence from KSE-100 Index

Khan¹,

Tanveer²,

Malik³

2017

10.5267/j.ac

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“…Under signalling theory (Spence, 1973), companies recognise that users of financial reports are relatively uninformed (versus managers) about their governance practices (see Zhang & Wiersema, 2009;Connolly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). Thus managers should signal that their own non-compliant practices are of equal value to those required by the Code by providing detailed and bespoke explanations.…”

Section: Theoretical Basismentioning

confidence: 99%

A typology for exploring the quality of explanations for non-compliance with UK corporate governance regulations

Shrives

Brennan

2015

The British Accounting Review

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Citation: Shrives, Philip and Brennan, Niamh (2015) A typology for exploring the quality of explanations for non-compliance with UK corporate governance regulations. The British Accounting Review, 47 (1 Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access the University's research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. Single copies of full items can be reproduced, displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder. The full policy is available online: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version of the research, please visit the publisher's website (a subscription may be required.)A typology for exploring the quality of explanations for non-compliance with UK corporate governance regulations There were 204 (125) non-compliant companies, 537 (253) Code breaches and 438 (208) explanations for non-compliance, an average of 2.6 (2.0) Code breaches and 2.2 (1.7) explanations per non-compliant company. Although compliance increased over the period examined, explanations were found to be of variable quality. Results suggest that companies need to improve the quality of their explanations if they are to be useful to users, notably location, complexity and specificity of explanations. There are also important questions raised about the work of auditors and their apparent silence. Companies are being encouraged to move towards compliance. We argue that this is against the 'comply-or-explain' philosophy which accepts that 'one size does not fit all.'Better quality of explanation is more important than compliance and thus companies may be unwittingly heading in the wrong direction.

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“…The studies have mainly focused on the CEO as a whole. In the past 10 years there has been negative focus on the CEO due to the widely publicized failures of WorldCom, Enron, Arthur Andersen, and Tyco [35]. According to Mcdonald et al, there have been a lot of studies around the CEOs influence on firm performance.…”

Section: Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Celebrity Chief Executive Officers Influence on Firm Performance: A Review of Theory and Evidence

Edwin¹,

Benjamin²

2017

Int J Econ Manag Sci

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Stock market reaction to CEO certification: the signaling role of CEO background

Cited by 324 publications

References 79 publications

An empirical analysis of corporate governance and firm value: Evidence from KSE-100 Index

An empirical analysis of corporate governance and firm value: Evidence from KSE-100 Index

A typology for exploring the quality of explanations for non-compliance with UK corporate governance regulations

Celebrity Chief Executive Officers Influence on Firm Performance: A Review of Theory and Evidence

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