Stochastic evolutionary game analysis of e-waste recycling in environmental regulation from the perspective of dual governance system

Liu, Xinmin; Lin, Kangkang; Wang, Lei

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.128685

Cited by 41 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Somewhat different in the way it is funded, China’s fund policy collects funds from producers rather than consumers and then subsidises recyclers according to the amount of e-waste recycled (Hischier et al 2005 ; Uwasu et al 2013 ). Due to the uniqueness of the fund policy, research interest in China’s e-waste management has increased significantly and developed in the past decade (Li et al 2015 ; Liu et al 2021 ; Zeng et al 2017 ). Existing literature discusses the issue of introducing the fund policy-centred management system and investigating the market responses to it (Cao et al 2016 ; Yang et al 2020 ).…”

Section: A Review Of China’s E-waste Management Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing e-waste from a closed-loop lifecycle perspective: China’s challenges and fund policy redesign

Tian

Liu

Yasemi

et al. 2022

Environ Sci Pollut Res

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E-waste is one of the fastest growing streams of solid waste globally, and its effective management has become a focused issue, which requires a deep understanding of the core guiding theory of extended producer responsibility (EPR). Over the past 20 years, China, one of the world’s largest producers of electrical and electronic equipment (EEE), has made great efforts to improve e-waste management along with the massive generation of e-waste. In 2012, China implemented a unique EPR-based e-waste fund policy. However, the fund policy is unsustainable due to the challenges of non-closed resource use, informal recycling, and fund imbalance. Beginning with an overview of these challenges, this paper focuses on redesigning the fund policy from a closed-loop lifecycle perspective in order to maintain a balanced development of the resource use loop and the fund system in China’s ten-year plan. In doing so, two EPR instruments, recycling content standards and consumer-oriented deposits, are added to the current fund policy. Subsequently, three extension scenarios alternately changed a critical parameter of the model to test the impact on sustainable capabilities. In this way, the sustainable supply of funds and secondary resources for the e-waste industry can be established in China and effectively demonstrate solid waste management in developing countries.

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Section: A Review Of China’s E-waste Management Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing e-waste from a closed-loop lifecycle perspective: China’s challenges and fund policy redesign

Tian

Liu

Yasemi

et al. 2022

Environ Sci Pollut Res

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“…, both 1 x − and 1 y − are non-negative and will not affect the decisions of banks and firms in the game. Thus, drawing on (Li et al, 2021;Liu et al, 2021;Shan et al, 2023), the replicated dynamic equation for the two-party game can be changed to the following form:…”

Section: Replication Dynamic Equationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A stochastic evolutionary game model of green credit participation behavior among banks and enterprises

Sun,

Feng

2024

Preprint

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With the growing severity of environmental problems, green credit has become an important means of promoting low-carbon development, however, the motivation of banks and enterprises to participate in green credit is insufficient. In order to effectively guide banks and enterprises to actively participate in green credit, we constructed a stochastic evolutionary game model for banks and enterprises to participate in green credit, and analyzed the dynamic game relationship between banks and enterprises. Due to the uncertainty of the external environment, we introduce Gaussian white noise in the replicated dynamic equations, and finally, we use numerical simulation to describe the dynamic evolution trend of the two-dimensional game system. The results show that the stochastic disturbances from external uncertainties amplify the fluctuation range of the game between banks and enterprises and shortening the time to achieve a stable strategy. As enterprises’ fulfillment levels improve, the strategic choices of both banks and enterprises gradually converge to (implement, participate), with banks converging more swiftly. When the government provides certain subsidies, both banks and enterprises tend to opt for green credit, however, after subsidies reach a certain threshold, increasing them no longer significantly impacts strategic choices. An escalation in carbon trading prices also spurs enterprises to choose green credit.

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“…Stochastic evolutionary games have now expanded from the original study of biological populations to a variety of fields. Liu et al [ 26 ] constructed a tripartite

stochastic evolutionary game model to study the problem in e-waste recycling management and provided constructive suggestions for the government to better formulate and implement environmental regulations. Li et al [ 46 ] applied a stochastic evolutionary game approach to study the knowledge-sharing behavior of the members in public–private-partnership supply chains, arguing that firms with strong knowledge power are more sensitive to parameter changes than firms with weak knowledge power.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the same time, referring to Li et al [ 49 ] introduced Gaussian distribution to the multiagent stochastic game study of charging facility construction. Liu et al [ 26 ] introduced Gaussian distribution to the multiagent stochastic game study of electronic waste recycling. We introduce Gaussian white noise in this study to characterize the stochastic disturbance of the game system and to improve the replicated dynamic equation, obtaining the following:

where

is the standard one-dimensional Brown motion.…”

Section: Construction Of the Stochastic Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model under the stochastic disturbance environment, aiming to solve the following key problems: (1) What are the payoff matrix and replication dynamic equations for environmental regulators, logistics companies, and consumers in the logistics-circular-packaging promotion game? (2) Is there an equilibrium solution in the game system after adding random disturbances [ 26 ], and if so, what are the boundary conditions? (3) What is the current status of the promotion and recycling of circular logistics packaging in China?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Analysis of the Dilemma of Promoting Circular Logistics Packaging in China: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game-Based Approach

Yang

2022

IJERPH

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The environmental pollution caused by logistics packaging in China has attracted increasing attention in recent years, and circular packaging is considered an effective means to solve the aforementioned problem. Therefore, this study considers the uncertainty of the external environment; constructs a stochastic game model of circular logistics-packaging promotion, which consists of environmental regulators, logistics enterprises, and consumers; collects data related to logistics packaging in China to describe the current circular-packaging promotion dilemma; and conducts a parameter-sensitivity analysis. The results show that (1) after a short period of fluctuation, the environmental regulator will lock in the “strong regulation” strategy, whereas logistics enterprises and consumers will quickly lock in the “no promotion” and “negative use” strategies. (2) The change in the initial probability will affect the rate of strategy evolution of the gaming system. (3) The “strong regulatory” strategy of environmental regulators and the increase in the number of circular-packaging cycles can help establish a logistics-recycling-packaging system. (4) The increase in recycling incentives can cause consumers to shift toward “active use” strategies, but this has accelerated the rate at which logistics companies lock into “no promotion” strategies. (5) The increase in the intensity of random interference will raise the fluctuation of the evolution of the game subject. For logistics enterprises, moderate random interference helps them evolve toward the “promotion” strategy.

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Stochastic evolutionary game analysis of e-waste recycling in environmental regulation from the perspective of dual governance system

Cited by 41 publications

References 39 publications

Managing e-waste from a closed-loop lifecycle perspective: China’s challenges and fund policy redesign

Managing e-waste from a closed-loop lifecycle perspective: China’s challenges and fund policy redesign

A stochastic evolutionary game model of green credit participation behavior among banks and enterprises

Analysis of the Dilemma of Promoting Circular Logistics Packaging in China: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game-Based Approach

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