Still no pill for men? Double standards &amp; demarcating values in biomedical research

ChoGlueck, Christopher

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.11.010

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…3 In view of these insights into the positive role of values in science and worries about bias, it is crucial to clarify where and how, exactly, to divide legitimate and illegitimate uses of non-epistemic values in science. Despite recent progress on this front (see, for example, Wilholt 2013;Intemann 2015;Winsberg, Oreskes, and Lloyd 2020;John 2021;Boulicault and Schroeder 2021;Koskinen and Rolin 2022;Holman and Wilholt 2022;ChoGlueck 2022;Bueter 2022), 4 Covid-19 offers new perspective.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inconvenient Truth and Inductive Risk in Covid-19 Science

Lichtenstein

2022

philmed

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To clarify the proper role of values in science, focusing on controversial expert responses to Covid-19, this article examines the status of (in)convenient hypotheses. Polarizing cases like health experts downplaying mask efficacy to save resources for healthcare workers, or scientists dismissing “accidental lab leak” hypotheses in view of potential xenophobia, plausibly involve modifying evidential standards for (in)convenient claims. Societies could accept that scientists handle (in)convenient claims just like nonscientists, and give experts less political power. Or societies could hold scientists to a higher bar, by expecting them not to modify evidential standards to avoid costs only incidentally tied to error.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inconvenient Truth and Inductive Risk in Covid-19 Science

Lichtenstein

2022

philmed

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Die Pille für den Mann – Wo fängt Sorgearbeit an? Formen technologisierter (Vor-)Sorge

Weigold

Henke

2023

Medizin – Technik – Ethik

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Feminist Philosophy of Science

Bueter

2024

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Feminist scholars have identified pervasive gender discrimination in science as an institution, as well as gender bias in the very content of many scientific theories. An ameliorative project at heart, feminist philosophy of science has inquired into the social and epistemological roots and consequences of these problems and into their potential solutions. Most feminist philosophers agree on a need for diversity in scientific communities to counter the detrimental effects of gender bias. Diversity could thus serve as a unifying concept for a potential consensus of the field. Yet there are substantial differences in the kinds and roles of diversity envisaged. This element argues that we need diversity, both in terms of social locations and of values, to overcome former biases and blind spots. Diversity as such, however, is insufficient. To reap its epistemic benefits, diversity also needs to be institutionalised in a way that counters various forms of epistemic injustice.

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Still no pill for men? Double standards & demarcating values in biomedical research

Cited by 3 publications

References 56 publications

Inconvenient Truth and Inductive Risk in Covid-19 Science

Inconvenient Truth and Inductive Risk in Covid-19 Science

Die Pille für den Mann – Wo fängt Sorgearbeit an? Formen technologisierter (Vor-)Sorge

Feminist Philosophy of Science

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