Steps toward a constructive nominalism

Goodman, Nelson; Quine, W. V.

doi:10.2307/2266485

Cited by 329 publications

(87 citation statements)

References 1 publication

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…1). 11 Carnap's notes of these discussions are published and extensively introduced in Frost-Arnold (2013). following the meetings-attempts that eventually culminate in his joint paper "Steps toward a Constructive Nominalism" (Goodman and Quine 1947). 12 A final development that seems to have contributed to Quine's increased philosophical aspirations in the early 1940s is his growing discontent with Carnap's views on language and ontology.…”

Section: Philosophical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sign and Object: Quine’s forgotten book project

Verhaegh

2018

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

W. V. Quine's first philosophical monograph, Word and Object (1960), is widely recognized as one of the most influential books of twentieth century philosophy. Notes, letters, and draft manuscripts at the Quine Archives, however, reveal that Quine was already working on a philosophical book in the early 1940s; a project entitled Sign and Object. In this paper, I examine these and other unpublished documents and show that Sign and Object sheds new light on the evolution of Quine's ideas. Where "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" is usually considered to be a turning point in Quine's development, this paper redefines the place of 'Two Dogmas' in his oeuvre. Not only does Quine's book project reveal that his views were already fairly naturalistic in the early 1940s (Sects. 3-5); Sign and Object also unearths the steps Quine had to take in maturing his perspective; steps that will be traced in the second half of this paper (Sects. 6-9).

show abstract

Section: Philosophical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sign and Object: Quine’s forgotten book project

Verhaegh

2018

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In the end, Quine was a grudging platonist, who believed in the existence of a single kind of abstract (that is, causally inert, non-spatiotemporal) mathematical entity: classes. If he could have it his way, he would rather be a nominalist (see, for instance, Goodman and Quine (1947) for an attempt to develop a constructive nominalism, which could not be made to work in the end).…”

Section: The Indispensability Argument: Quine Versus Putnammentioning

confidence: 99%

Putnam’s indispensability argument revisited, reassessed, revived

Bueno¹

2018

THEORIA

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Crucial to Hilary Putnam's realism in the philosophy of mathematics is to maintain the objectivity of mathematics without the commitment to the existence of mathematical objects. Putnam's indispensability argument was devised as part of this conception. In this paper, I reconstruct and reassess Putnam's argument for the indispensability of mathematics, and distinguish it from the more familiar, Quinean version of the argument. Although I argue that Putnam's approach ultimately fails, I develop an alternative way of implementing his form of realism about mathematics that, by using different resources than those Putnam invokes, avoids the difficulties faced by his view.Keywords: Indispensability, Ontological Commitment, Objectivity, Platonism, Modalism, Putnam.RESUMEN: Es esencial para el realismo de Putnam en filosofía de la matemática el poder mantener la objetividad de la matemática sin comprometerse con la existencia de objetos matemáticos. La versión de Putnam del argumento de la indispensabilidad se concibió desde esta concepción. En este artículo reconstruyo y re-evalúo la versión del argumento de Putnam, distinguiéndolo de la versión quineana. Muestro que la propuesta de Putnam fracasa, y desarrollo una forma alternativa de articular esta forma de realismo matemático. La alternativa propuesta utiliza recursos diferentes a los de Putnam y evita así las dificultades que la propuesta de Putnam enfrenta.

show abstract

“…For this theory, there is a suitable criterion for formulation, namely Quine's criterion: ''to be is to be the value of a variable'' (Bocheński 1993a, 96). According to Bocheński, Goodman and Quine interpret functors not as variables but as ''schematic letters'' or ''imitation letters,'' indicating thereby that they do not have correlates in the phenomenal world (Goodman and Quine 1947). Bocheński claims that Goodman-Quine's approach must be rejected for two reasons.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Two approaches to the problem of universals by J. M. Bocheński

Grygianiec

2013

Stud East Eur Thought

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The main aim of the paper is to reconstruct and analyse two methodological approaches to the problem of universals, presented in Bocheński's papers ''Powszechniki jako treści cech w filozofii św. Tomasza z Akwinu'' and ''The Problem of Universals.'' It is argued that, although these approaches are rather different from historical and methodological points of view, they are still based on the same ontological ground, viz. on immanent realism. The article provides a detailed analysis and comparison of the respective views. Justification is provided for the claim that Bocheński was an immanent realist and some of Bocheński's detailed solutions are highlighted that may be of particular importance for further debate over the problem of universals. A couple of minor critical comments concerning some of Bocheński's analyses are presented at the end of the paper.

show abstract

Steps toward a constructive nominalism

Cited by 329 publications

References 1 publication

Sign and Object: Quine’s forgotten book project

Sign and Object: Quine’s forgotten book project

Putnam’s indispensability argument revisited, reassessed, revived

Two approaches to the problem of universals by J. M. Bocheński

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About